CAJ | 학술논문

交往主体作为“经济人”，在市场的博弈过程中，追逐自身利益最大化是个体理性的选择，但在日常经济活动中，个体理性往往导致集体非理性结局。本文运用哈贝马斯的“交往理性”理论剖析了山东省聊城市东海铸锻破产案，在政府主导或外部力量适度干预下，通过谈判磋商，最终促进多家银行与企业达到交往理性的均衡状态，并据此提出了相关风险处置的顶层设计。
교왕주체작위“경제인”，재시장적박혁과정중，추축자신이익최대화시개체이성적선택，단재일상경제활동중，개체이성왕왕도치집체비이성결국。본문운용합패마사적“교왕이성”이론부석료산동성료성시동해주단파산안，재정부주도혹외부역량괄도간예하，통과담판차상，최종촉진다가은행여기업체도교왕이성적균형상태，병거차제출료상관풍험처치적정층설계。
Communication subjects as the economic man chase benefits maximization,which are the choice of in-dividual rationality. While individual rationality is always not achieved instead of communicative rationality finally. In this paper,Habermas theory of communicative rationality and the bankrupt case of Donghai cast in Liaocheng are com-bined to analyze. It describes how individual rationality reaches equilibrium of communicative rationality, and then points that government leading or moderate intervention of external forces are helpful to reduce the prisoner’s dilemma through consultations,so as to realize the optimal allocation of social resources. At last,it puts forward a new idea of top-level design for reducing credit risk fundamentally.