廉政文化研究
廉政文化研究
렴정문화연구
ANTI-CORRUPTION AND INTEGRITY CULTURE STUDIES
2015年
2期
66-77
,共12页
公职人员%财产申报%盲目信托
公職人員%財產申報%盲目信託
공직인원%재산신보%맹목신탁
public servants%asset reporting system%blind trusts
政府公职人员以权谋私、贪污腐败是长期以来难以彻底解决的世界性难题。美国主要通过《政府行为准则法》建立了政府公职人员财产申报与盲目信托相结合的制度,预防公职人员的腐败;我国台湾地区也仿效推行官员强制信托制度,二者各有利弊。在我国设立财产申报与强制性盲目信托相结合的反腐败预防性法律机制完全可行,因为无论从物权法、侵权法还是信托法的角度来看,盲目信托在我国的推行都没有法律障碍。推行盲目信托制度作为一种事先预防机制,虽然一开始可能会增加部分监管成本,但是将其制度化之后,总体成本应该比事后监管要低。具体可由政府成立专门的机构制定细则,明确需要设立盲目信托的公职人员范围,确定受托人资质,由其对公职人员的财产进行投资和管理,并通过加强监管来弥补美国盲目信托制度中出现的漏洞。
政府公職人員以權謀私、貪汙腐敗是長期以來難以徹底解決的世界性難題。美國主要通過《政府行為準則法》建立瞭政府公職人員財產申報與盲目信託相結閤的製度,預防公職人員的腐敗;我國檯灣地區也倣效推行官員彊製信託製度,二者各有利弊。在我國設立財產申報與彊製性盲目信託相結閤的反腐敗預防性法律機製完全可行,因為無論從物權法、侵權法還是信託法的角度來看,盲目信託在我國的推行都沒有法律障礙。推行盲目信託製度作為一種事先預防機製,雖然一開始可能會增加部分鑑管成本,但是將其製度化之後,總體成本應該比事後鑑管要低。具體可由政府成立專門的機構製定細則,明確需要設立盲目信託的公職人員範圍,確定受託人資質,由其對公職人員的財產進行投資和管理,併通過加彊鑑管來瀰補美國盲目信託製度中齣現的漏洞。
정부공직인원이권모사、탐오부패시장기이래난이철저해결적세계성난제。미국주요통과《정부행위준칙법》건립료정부공직인원재산신보여맹목신탁상결합적제도,예방공직인원적부패;아국태만지구야방효추행관원강제신탁제도,이자각유리폐。재아국설립재산신보여강제성맹목신탁상결합적반부패예방성법률궤제완전가행,인위무론종물권법、침권법환시신탁법적각도래간,맹목신탁재아국적추행도몰유법률장애。추행맹목신탁제도작위일충사선예방궤제,수연일개시가능회증가부분감관성본,단시장기제도화지후,총체성본응해비사후감관요저。구체가유정부성립전문적궤구제정세칙,명학수요설립맹목신탁적공직인원범위,학정수탁인자질,유기대공직인원적재산진행투자화관리,병통과가강감관래미보미국맹목신탁제도중출현적루동。
Corruption and abuse of power for obtaining personal gains by government officials and public servants have become a universal problem which cannot be completely resolved within a considerable length of time. The United States has estab-lished a system integrating public servants’asset reporting and blind trusts through its 1978 Ethics in Government Act, in line with some other laws, to prevent public servants’corruption. In Taiwan district, a compulsory trusts system has been imple-mented among public servants to achieve the same goal. This article examines the practices of the United States and Taiwan District and finds that both the US non-compulsory blind trusts system and Taiwan’s compulsory non-blind trusts system have both advantages and disadvantages. It’s suggested in the paper that we should adopt a system combining public servants’asset reporting and compulsory blind trusts in order to avoid conflict of interests, or other corruptions. It is perfectly feasible to do so in the mainland because there is no legal barrier against blind trusts in the Property Law, Tort Law, or Trust Law. Furthermore, the blind trusts system serves as ex ante and preventive mechanism. Although it may increase some supervision cost in the be-ginning phase, once institutionalized, the total cost shall be below the cost of ex post facto control of corruption. The article sug-gests that the government may establish a specialized institution to make implementing rules, clarify the scope of public servants who will be required to establish blind trusts, and determine the qualification of the trustees who will manage the public ser-vants’assets. In addition, stronger supervision is needed to correct the drawback of the US blind trust system.