经济问题
經濟問題
경제문제
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
2015年
5期
90-95
,共6页
监督%激励%风险
鑑督%激勵%風險
감독%격려%풍험
supervision%incentives%risk
经典代理理论认为，激励和风险之间存在权衡关系，经深入分析发现事实并非总是如此。由于企业所有者控制企业管理层存在监督和激励两项基本措施，随着风险的加大，监督成本和激励成本都会加大，所有者控制措施的选择取决于两种成本的比较。激励与风险之间的关系曲线，由于受到监督的制约，两者并非负线性关系。基于我国上市公司样本的实证研究结果表明，我国上市公司管理层补偿与风险之间存在倒“U”形关系，管理层补偿绩效弹性与风险之间存在倒“U”形关系。同时，监督对我国上市公司管理层补偿存在负向影响，这种负向影响随着风险的逐步增大而加强。
經典代理理論認為，激勵和風險之間存在權衡關繫，經深入分析髮現事實併非總是如此。由于企業所有者控製企業管理層存在鑑督和激勵兩項基本措施，隨著風險的加大，鑑督成本和激勵成本都會加大，所有者控製措施的選擇取決于兩種成本的比較。激勵與風險之間的關繫麯線，由于受到鑑督的製約，兩者併非負線性關繫。基于我國上市公司樣本的實證研究結果錶明，我國上市公司管理層補償與風險之間存在倒“U”形關繫，管理層補償績效彈性與風險之間存在倒“U”形關繫。同時，鑑督對我國上市公司管理層補償存在負嚮影響，這種負嚮影響隨著風險的逐步增大而加彊。
경전대리이론인위，격려화풍험지간존재권형관계，경심입분석발현사실병비총시여차。유우기업소유자공제기업관리층존재감독화격려량항기본조시，수착풍험적가대，감독성본화격려성본도회가대，소유자공제조시적선택취결우량충성본적비교。격려여풍험지간적관계곡선，유우수도감독적제약，량자병비부선성관계。기우아국상시공사양본적실증연구결과표명，아국상시공사관리층보상여풍험지간존재도“U”형관계，관리층보상적효탄성여풍험지간존재도“U”형관계。동시，감독대아국상시공사관리층보상존재부향영향，저충부향영향수착풍험적축보증대이가강。
Classical agency theory shows there is a trade-off relationship between incentive and risk.However, It is not always true.Firstly, because there are two basic measures including incentive and supervision when owners take measure to control the management, and incentive cost and supervision cost will increase with the increased risk, the choose of owners depends on the comparison of the incentive cost and supervision cost.Secondly, the re-lationship between incentives and risk curves is not negative linear due to the constraints of supervision.Based on the Chinese listed company sample empirical study found that, there exists the inverted “U” shape between man-agement compensation and risk in the listed company of our country, and there exists the inverted“U” shape rela-tionship between management compensation performance flexibility and risk.At the same time, supervision of listed company of our country have a negative effect on executive compensation, and this kind of negative effect will in-crease along with the risk.
