贵州财经大学学报
貴州財經大學學報
귀주재경대학학보
Journal of Guizhou College of Finance and Economics
2015年
4期
86-93
,共8页
政产学研%演化博弈%协同创新%稳定性
政產學研%縯化博弈%協同創新%穩定性
정산학연%연화박혁%협동창신%은정성
political research%evolutionary game%collaborative innovation%stability
在有限理性的前提下,从政产学研角度出发,利用演化博弈模型建立三对博弈主体,并分别对每一对博弈主体进行协同创新演化稳定性分析,找出影响政产学研协同创新长期稳定合作的因素。分析发现:系统对初始条件具有非常强的敏感性;产学研之间有效的信任机制和约束机制是双方能够长期合作的重要保障;政府积极引导并增强学研方之间的信任度及彼此之间的约束,是提高协同创新稳定性的关键。
在有限理性的前提下,從政產學研角度齣髮,利用縯化博弈模型建立三對博弈主體,併分彆對每一對博弈主體進行協同創新縯化穩定性分析,找齣影響政產學研協同創新長期穩定閤作的因素。分析髮現:繫統對初始條件具有非常彊的敏感性;產學研之間有效的信任機製和約束機製是雙方能夠長期閤作的重要保障;政府積極引導併增彊學研方之間的信任度及彼此之間的約束,是提高協同創新穩定性的關鍵。
재유한이성적전제하,종정산학연각도출발,이용연화박혁모형건립삼대박혁주체,병분별대매일대박혁주체진행협동창신연화은정성분석,조출영향정산학연협동창신장기은정합작적인소。분석발현:계통대초시조건구유비상강적민감성;산학연지간유효적신임궤제화약속궤제시쌍방능구장기합작적중요보장;정부적겁인도병증강학연방지간적신임도급피차지간적약속,시제고협동창신은정성적관건。
In this paper,under the premise of bounded rationality,political research pe -rspective,by using evolutionary game model,the establishment of three of the main game,respectively,for each of the main game of collaborative innovation evolutionar -y stability analysis,find out the influence factors of political research long -term stable cooperative innovation synergy,and draw conclusions.Found that the system has a very strong initial conditions sensitivity;trust mechanism and effective constraint mec -hanism research between the two sides is an important guarantee for the two sides to long-term cooperation;the government actively guide by adopting certain policies to enhance the trust between at parties and constraint each other,is the key to improving the stability of collaborative innovation.