北京工业大学学报(社会科学版)
北京工業大學學報(社會科學版)
북경공업대학학보(사회과학판)
JOURNAL OF BEIJING UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY(SOCIAL SCIENCES EDITION)
2015年
3期
26-33,39
,共9页
内部控制%非效率投资%高管配置%高管集权%家族高管
內部控製%非效率投資%高管配置%高管集權%傢族高管
내부공제%비효솔투자%고관배치%고관집권%가족고관
internal control%inefficient investment%managerial distribution%concentration of managerial power%family manager
针对中国家族企业内部控制对投资效率的治理作用问题,以2010—2013年上市家族企业为研究样本,从内部控制这一视角出发,结合家族企业特征引入高管配置要素,将微观的内部控制与宏观的公司治理结合起来,系统考察企业的非效率投资与内部控制之间的关系。研究结果表明:在其他条件一定的情况下,内部控制能有效抑制企业的非效率投资,且对于高管集权的家族企业,这种抑制作用得到大大增强,反之则抑制作用不明显。此外,当高管由家族人员担任时,内部控制对非效率投资的抑制作用得到显著的提升,而当高管由非家族人员担任时,这种抑制作用并不显著。
針對中國傢族企業內部控製對投資效率的治理作用問題,以2010—2013年上市傢族企業為研究樣本,從內部控製這一視角齣髮,結閤傢族企業特徵引入高管配置要素,將微觀的內部控製與宏觀的公司治理結閤起來,繫統攷察企業的非效率投資與內部控製之間的關繫。研究結果錶明:在其他條件一定的情況下,內部控製能有效抑製企業的非效率投資,且對于高管集權的傢族企業,這種抑製作用得到大大增彊,反之則抑製作用不明顯。此外,噹高管由傢族人員擔任時,內部控製對非效率投資的抑製作用得到顯著的提升,而噹高管由非傢族人員擔任時,這種抑製作用併不顯著。
침대중국가족기업내부공제대투자효솔적치리작용문제,이2010—2013년상시가족기업위연구양본,종내부공제저일시각출발,결합가족기업특정인입고관배치요소,장미관적내부공제여굉관적공사치리결합기래,계통고찰기업적비효솔투자여내부공제지간적관계。연구결과표명:재기타조건일정적정황하,내부공제능유효억제기업적비효솔투자,차대우고관집권적가족기업,저충억제작용득도대대증강,반지칙억제작용불명현。차외,당고관유가족인원담임시,내부공제대비효솔투자적억제작용득도현저적제승,이당고관유비가족인원담임시,저충억제작용병불현저。
The Chinese family businesses are at the turning point of transformation, and the governance issues and decision making risks are the key impediments to their development. In order to explore the governance role of internal control in family businesses’ inefficient investment, this paper uses 2010—2013 sample data from listed family businesses to systematically study the relationship between the inefficient investment and the internal control from the unique perspective of internal control. The study combines the micro internal control with the macro corporate governance by introducing the managerial distribution factors in view of family business characteristics. The result shows that in the same circumstances, the internal control effectively restrains inefficient investment. This observation is particularly applied to the businesses with concentration of managerial power in contrast with those with decentralization of managerial power. In addition, such inhibitory effect can be enhanced significantly when family members acting as top managers. In turn, such inhibitory effect is non-significant in the businesses with non-family managers.