科技管理研究
科技管理研究
과기관리연구
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT RESEARCH
2015年
10期
155-160,165
,共7页
高鹏%聂佳佳%陆玉梅
高鵬%聶佳佳%陸玉梅
고붕%섭가가%륙옥매
合作研发投资%溢出效应%闭环供应链%Stackelberg 博弈
閤作研髮投資%溢齣效應%閉環供應鏈%Stackelberg 博弈
합작연발투자%일출효응%폐배공응련%Stackelberg 박혁
cooperative R&D investment%spillover effect%closed -loop supply chain%Stackelberg game
研究由一个 OEM和一个 IR 组成的专利授权型闭环供应链,双方分别开展技术研发活动并存在溢出效应。建立并求解了三阶段闭环供应链独立研发和合作研发博弈模型,采用灵敏度分析和数值仿真对结果进行了分析。研究表明:双方研发投资额与再制造节约成本之间的关系取决于对方研发投资成本的大小;合作研发下的研发投资额高于独立研发模式,OEM和供应链整体利润始终高于独立研发,大多数情况下 IR 的利润低于独立研发模式。
研究由一箇 OEM和一箇 IR 組成的專利授權型閉環供應鏈,雙方分彆開展技術研髮活動併存在溢齣效應。建立併求解瞭三階段閉環供應鏈獨立研髮和閤作研髮博弈模型,採用靈敏度分析和數值倣真對結果進行瞭分析。研究錶明:雙方研髮投資額與再製造節約成本之間的關繫取決于對方研髮投資成本的大小;閤作研髮下的研髮投資額高于獨立研髮模式,OEM和供應鏈整體利潤始終高于獨立研髮,大多數情況下 IR 的利潤低于獨立研髮模式。
연구유일개 OEM화일개 IR 조성적전리수권형폐배공응련,쌍방분별개전기술연발활동병존재일출효응。건립병구해료삼계단폐배공응련독립연발화합작연발박혁모형,채용령민도분석화수치방진대결과진행료분석。연구표명:쌍방연발투자액여재제조절약성본지간적관계취결우대방연발투자성본적대소;합작연발하적연발투자액고우독립연발모식,OEM화공응련정체리윤시종고우독립연발,대다수정황하 IR 적리윤저우독립연발모식。
This paper analyzes patent authorization strategy of closed -loop supply chain composed by one Original Equip-ment Manufacturer and one Independent Remanufacturer who are developing technology R&D activities of spillover effects. An independent and cooperative R&D game model in three -stage closed -loop supply chain is established and solved and the result is studied by derivation method and sensitivity analysis.The study shows that the relationship between a member’ s R&D investment and remanufacturing saving cost depends on the investment cost of the other member.In the R&D invest-ment,the profit of OEMand supply chain in cooperative mode is higher than that in independent mode while the profit of IR is lower than that in most cases.