CAJ | 학술논문

从缓解中小企业融资约束的视角出发，对基于抵质押制度和声誉机制共同激励的财务公司产业链金融信用风险控制机制进行研究。在一个中小企业类型为单边非完全信息结构的假设条件下，建立博弈模型分析抵质押制度与声誉机制共同激励下中小企业的行为选择，研究发现共同激励可以有效扩大财务公司的安全授信边界，既能确保财务公司控制中小企业信用风险，又能增加中小企业的授信额度。
종완해중소기업융자약속적시각출발，대기우저질압제도화성예궤제공동격려적재무공사산업련금융신용풍험공제궤제진행연구。재일개중소기업류형위단변비완전신식결구적가설조건하，건립박혁모형분석저질압제도여성예궤제공동격려하중소기업적행위선택，연구발현공동격려가이유효확대재무공사적안전수신변계，기능학보재무공사공제중소기업신용풍험，우능증가중소기업적수신액도。
From the perspective of easing the SMEs’financing constraints, this paper made a research on the industrial chain financial credit risk control mechanism of finance company which encouraged based on the collaterals system and reputation mechanism. On the assumptions of one enterprise which has unilateral incomplete information, the author analyzed the SMEs’ behavior selection which encouraged by both the collaterals system and reputation mechanism from the game model. The paper found that the common incentive could expand the credit border security of finance company effectively. In this way, we can guarantee the finance company’s control on the SMEs’credit risk, and increase the SMEs’lines of credit, too.