CAJ | 학술논문

针对政府重大工程项目合谋腐败现象频频发生，对政府利益和工程质量造成严重危害的问题，为了有效抑制监理方和承包商合谋现象发生，对政府工程项目下政府、监理公司和施工承包商三方演化博弈过程进行了研究。首先在有限理性的条件下引入前进理论建立博弈模型，得到Nash均衡，然后利用演化博弈理论求得不同监理风险态度状况下的演化稳定状态，最后，利用系统动力学软件对演化博弈过程进行仿真，验证稳定策略，并通过仿真得到抑制合谋的主要因素及打击方法，分析并给出了有限理性下打击合谋的监管策略，为打击政府重大工程项目合谋提供参考。
침대정부중대공정항목합모부패현상빈빈발생，대정부이익화공정질량조성엄중위해적문제，위료유효억제감리방화승포상합모현상발생，대정부공정항목하정부、감리공사화시공승포상삼방연화박혁과정진행료연구。수선재유한이성적조건하인입전진이론건립박혁모형，득도Nash균형，연후이용연화박혁이론구득불동감리풍험태도상황하적연화은정상태，최후，이용계통동역학연건대연화박혁과정진행방진，험증은정책략，병통과방진득도억제합모적주요인소급타격방법，분석병급출료유한이성하타격합모적감관책략，위타격정부중대공정항목합모제공삼고。
Corruption or collusion has frequently occurred in the major government investment projects , which has already brought great harm to the interest of the government and the quality of the projects .In order to effectively restrain collusion which formed by the supervision and the contractor , an evolutionary game model was structured to analyze the collusion in bounded ra-tionality.Firstly, through the model , the Nash equilibrium and the evolutionary equilibrium in different supervision ’ s risk atti-tudes were figured out based on combining prospect theory and evolutionary game theory .Then, a system dynamics model ( SD) was built to prove equilibrium results .The stability analysis and simulation illustrate the ways to control the collusion and prove that SD model and evolutionary game theory can work in controlling collusion for the government use .