CAJ | 학술논문

现实经济活动中，价格不是影响需求的唯一要素，产品质量与终端的分销服务也是重要因素。基于自身利益最大化的原则，供应商和零售商均会执行有利于自身收益的行为决策，其中可能会存在一些隐藏的欺诈行为，由此导致供应链活动中双边道德风险问题。本文分析了不同渠道力量背景下渠道活动中存在的双边道德风险问题，研究了供应商主导和零售商主导情况下的最优零供合同设计，认为线性合同可以很好地解决供应链活动中的双边道德风险问题；同时指出，终端零售价格以及通道费收取模式对不同主体拥有渠道势力下的零售商与供应商之间的最优合同设计会产生直接影响。
현실경제활동중，개격불시영향수구적유일요소，산품질량여종단적분소복무야시중요인소。기우자신이익최대화적원칙，공응상화령수상균회집행유리우자신수익적행위결책，기중가능회존재일사은장적기사행위，유차도치공응련활동중쌍변도덕풍험문제。본문분석료불동거도역량배경하거도활동중존재적쌍변도덕풍험문제，연구료공응상주도화령수상주도정황하적최우령공합동설계，인위선성합동가이흔호지해결공응련활동중적쌍변도덕풍험문제；동시지출，종단령수개격이급통도비수취모식대불동주체옹유거도세력하적령수상여공응상지간적최우합동설계회산생직접영향。
In real economic activities,the factors that affect consumer demand are not only price,but also the services provided by retailers and the quality of the product that provided by suppliers. For their own profits,the retailers and supplies are likely to cheat,which leads to the problem of bilateral moral hazard in the supply chain activities. The authors set a linear demand function in which demand are decided by price,service and quality and investigate the issue of optimal contract design in the case of supplier-dominant channel and retailer-dominant channel respectively. The results confirms that the linear contract can solve the problem of moral hazard,what’s more,it points out that the terminal retail price and the mode of channel fees have direct impact on the design of optimal contract between retailers and suppliers in different channel power.