CAJ | 학술논문

针对三寡头垄断市场，考虑竞争能力较强企业投资研发新技术的可能性，对内部创新企业面对不同竞争能力的两个在位企业时的专利许可问题进行博弈分析。在内部创新企业与竞争能力较强企业的边际成本相同的情况下，研究表明：当专利许可不能阻止竞争能力较强企业投资研发新技术时，将降低市场总利润及社会福利；反之，专利许可对市场总利润及社会福利的影响由弱势企业将专利技术商业化所需投入成本与竞争能力较强企业研发新技术所需投资额的大小共同决定。
침대삼과두롱단시장，고필경쟁능력교강기업투자연발신기술적가능성，대내부창신기업면대불동경쟁능력적량개재위기업시적전리허가문제진행박혁분석。재내부창신기업여경쟁능력교강기업적변제성본상동적정황하，연구표명：당전리허가불능조지경쟁능력교강기업투자연발신기술시，장강저시장총리윤급사회복리；반지，전리허가대시장총리윤급사회복리적영향유약세기업장전리기술상업화소수투입성본여경쟁능력교강기업연발신기술소수투자액적대소공동결정。
This thesis aims at the three oligopoly market,considering the possibility of the competitive company’s invest-ment for researching new technology.Using the game model,analyze the patent licensing problem about the inside innova-tive business facing two companies with different competitive capacity in the market.Suppose the marginal cost of the inside innovative company and the competitive company takes a common value,the research shows that the inside innovative com-pany licenses its technology to the disadvantaged enterprise,and the competitive company also enters the industry through making investment to research new technology,the patent licensing may decrease the marketing gross profit and social wel-fare;The inside innovative company licenses its technology to the disadvantaged enterprise,and it deters the competitive company from entering the industry,the impact of patent licensing?brings to the marketing gross profit and social welfare will be decided by the required inputcost that the disadvantaged enterprise needs for the commercialization of patented tech-nology and the required amount of investment that the competitive company needs for researching new technology.