CAJ | 학술논문

文章基于保险公司与科技型中小企业之间的风险分担博弈模型，对科技型中小企业同时存在道德风险和逆向选择时，保险公司所要采取的动态激励进行了分析研究。通过博弈论和委托—代理理论，讨论了存在两阶段动态博弈时，保险公司可以通过观察第一年内的违约频率来估计未来承保期可能的损失，并判断科技型中小企业采取的最优努力水平，以决定是否继续发放贷款以及后一阶段的保费。保险公司和银行可以通过监控科技型中小企业的历史经营数据等内部数据以及纳税记录、客户反馈等外部数据，以改善金融机构与科技型中小企业间信息不对称的格局，清晰地甄别出企业的风险状况，为制定差异化保险费率和发放贷款数额提供数据支持。该研究对保险公司制定费率有一定的理论意义。
문장기우보험공사여과기형중소기업지간적풍험분담박혁모형，대과기형중소기업동시존재도덕풍험화역향선택시，보험공사소요채취적동태격려진행료분석연구。통과박혁론화위탁—대리이론，토론료존재량계단동태박혁시，보험공사가이통과관찰제일년내적위약빈솔래고계미래승보기가능적손실，병판단과기형중소기업채취적최우노력수평，이결정시부계속발방대관이급후일계단적보비。보험공사화은행가이통과감공과기형중소기업적역사경영수거등내부수거이급납세기록、객호반궤등외부수거，이개선금융궤구여과기형중소기업간신식불대칭적격국，청석지견별출기업적풍험상황，위제정차이화보험비솔화발방대관수액제공수거지지。해연구대보험공사제정비솔유일정적이론의의。
Based on the risk-sharing contract model between the insurer and the small and medium-sized S&T enterprise(Tech SME), this article analyzes the dynamic incentive mechanism that should be taken by the insurance company when moral hazard and adverse selection exist in Tech SME at the same time. This paper discusses two-stages dynamic game exists in risk sharing by the game and prin-cipal-agent theory. Then the insurer can predict the loss distribution of next year according to the default frequency occurs in one year, and can judge optimal effort level of the Tech SME, then can decide whether to continue the loans or the next premium. The insurance companies and banks could reduce the information asymmetry between the financial institutions and the Tech SME, and also could identify clearly the risk status of the enterprise by monitoring internal data and external data of the Tech SME such as history management data, tax records, as well as customer feedback, which could provide data support to make different premium rate and the amount of loans for the financial institutions. It could provide further theoretical foundation for the insurer who designs the reasonable incentive contract.