CAJ | 학술논문

股权结构如何影响企业研发投入一直是理论界关注的重大问题。而传统的研究忽视了企业间控股结构对研发投入的影响。结合产权性质，全面地考察了金字塔控股特征对于企业研发投入的影响。实证表明当终极控制人为国家时，其研发投入少于终极控制人为非国家的企业；随着终极控制人控制权的加强，金字塔集团控制链的长度、公司的数量对上市公司研发投入产生的复杂效应不断减弱；两权分离度对研发投入具有负影响；当终极控制人为国家时，复杂效应与分离效应均不显著；当终极控制人为其他主体时，复杂效应与分离效应却很显著。
고권결구여하영향기업연발투입일직시이론계관주적중대문제。이전통적연구홀시료기업간공고결구대연발투입적영향。결합산권성질，전면지고찰료금자탑공고특정대우기업연발투입적영향。실증표명당종겁공제인위국가시，기연발투입소우종겁공제인위비국가적기업；수착종겁공제인공제권적가강，금자탑집단공제련적장도、공사적수량대상시공사연발투입산생적복잡효응불단감약；량권분리도대연발투입구유부영향；당종겁공제인위국가시，복잡효응여분리효응균불현저；당종겁공제인위기타주체시，복잡효응여분리효응각흔현저。
The influence of ownership structure on corporate investment in R & D has been a major problem in theory field.The traditional research ignores the effect of holding structure between different corporate on R&D investment.In this paper,a comprehensive analysis of the effect of corporate pyramids structure on R&D combined with difference of property rights is done.The empirical results show that,in the case of other conditions unchanged,state -controlled firms in China pay less R&D investment than others;firms with longer control chain and more members pay less R&D investment,but the increase of control rights will reduce the negative effect;the separation of cash flow rights and control rights has a negative effect on R&D investment;when the ultimate controller is the country,scale effect and the separation effect is not signifi-cant;when the ultimate controllers are other body,scale effect and the separation effect is very significant.