CAJ | 학술논문

经济的稳步发展和城市化进程的加快对城市轨道交通提出了更高的要求，BT模式有利于缓解政府资金压力，提高项目建设效率，该模式已经被广泛应用于城市轨道交通建设。本文利用委托代理理论研究城市轨道交通BT项目的委托代理关系，基于非完全信息下的合作博弈关系构建最优激励报酬模型，并对模型最优解进行分析，得到各个参数对激励报酬系数的作用效果，在此基础上为发起方提出激励对策和建议，具有一定的参考价值。
경제적은보발전화성시화진정적가쾌대성시궤도교통제출료경고적요구，BT모식유리우완해정부자금압력，제고항목건설효솔，해모식이경피엄범응용우성시궤도교통건설。본문이용위탁대리이론연구성시궤도교통BT항목적위탁대리관계，기우비완전신식하적합작박혁관계구건최우격려보수모형，병대모형최우해진행분석，득도각개삼수대격려보수계수적작용효과，재차기출상위발기방제출격려대책화건의，구유일정적삼고개치。
The steady development of economy and the speeding up of urbanization have put forward higher requirements for the urban traffic system, since BT model can reduce the pressure on government funds and improve the project con?struction efficiency, it has been widely used in urban rail transit construction. Supported by the principal-agent theory, the paper analyzes the principal-agent relationship of urban rail transit BT project, then builds the optimal incentive com?pensation model based on the cooperative game relationship under incomplete information, with that it analyzes the opti?mal solutions of the model and gets the action effects of various parameters on the incentive compensation coefficients, and on this basis it puts forward some incentive countermeasures and suggestions for the sponsors, hoping to provide some reference .