CAJ | 학술논문

为研究公平关切对闭环供应链成员决策的影响，基于 Stackelberg 理论，分别研究零售商公平关切、零售商和制造商皆公平关切两种情形。研究表明，仅零售商公平关切时批发价契约时的批发价低于分散式决策的情形，零售价则相反，废旧品供给量不变。零售商和制造商皆公平关切时零售商公平关切和批发价成反比，制造商公平关切和批发价成正比，回收转移价格则相反。另外，制造商和零售商过度公平关切导致闭环供应链系统的损失和社会环保程度的降低。
위연구공평관절대폐배공응련성원결책적영향，기우 Stackelberg 이론，분별연구령수상공평관절、령수상화제조상개공평관절량충정형。연구표명，부령수상공평관절시비발개계약시적비발개저우분산식결책적정형，령수개칙상반，폐구품공급량불변。령수상화제조상개공평관절시령수상공평관절화비발개성반비，제조상공평관절화비발개성정비，회수전이개격칙상반。령외，제조상화령수상과도공평관절도치폐배공응련계통적손실화사회배보정도적강저。
In order to study the influence of fairness concern and reference dependence of the closed -loop supply chain members on the optimal pricing decisions,based on the theory of Stackelberg game,we explore the two cases when only re-tailers have fair concerns,as well as when manufacturers and retailers all have fairness concerns.Numerical simulation shows that when only retailers have fair concerns,the manufacturersˊwholesale price under the whole price contract is lower than the case when it is decentralized decision -making,and we have the opposite conclusion on the retail price.When manufacturers and retailers all have fairness concerns and reference dependence,the manufacturerˊs wholesale price is a de-creasing function of the retailerˊs fairness concern and reference preference,an increasing function of their fairness concern and reference preference,and we have the opposite conclusion on the manufacturerˊs recycling transfer price.Further,when the competition between the retailers and manufactures is excessively high,it will lead to the low efficiency of the closed -loop and poor environmental conditions.