CAJ | 학술논문

过度投资作为低效率的投资方式会破坏企业价值和股东财富，有效的外部治理机制能够约束管理层利用权力实施过度投资寻租的行为。以2006年至2013年中国上市企业数据为样本，以产品市场竞争和外部大股东持股衡量外部治理机制，分别采用单变量分析和多元回归方法，实证研究管理层权力对过度投资的影响以及外部治理机制对过度投资－管理层权力敏感性的影响。研究结果表明，中国上市企业的管理层综合权力越大，过度投资现象越严重。不同管理层权力维度变量对过度投资的影响不同，任职年限长、学历水平高以及持有本企业股份的管理层，越有可能利用手中的权力实施过度投资；总经理与董事长两职兼任有利于降低过度投资行为，提高企业投资效率。产品市场竞争和外部大股东持股均能显著影响过度投资与管理层权力之间关系的敏感性，外部大股东持股比重越高、产品市场竞争越激烈，越能有效抑制管理层利用权力实施过度投资的行为。
과도투자작위저효솔적투자방식회파배기업개치화고동재부，유효적외부치리궤제능구약속관리층이용권력실시과도투자심조적행위。이2006년지2013년중국상시기업수거위양본，이산품시장경쟁화외부대고동지고형량외부치리궤제，분별채용단변량분석화다원회귀방법，실증연구관리층권력대과도투자적영향이급외부치리궤제대과도투자－관리층권력민감성적영향。연구결과표명，중국상시기업적관리층종합권력월대，과도투자현상월엄중。불동관리층권력유도변량대과도투자적영향불동，임직년한장、학력수평고이급지유본기업고빈적관리층，월유가능이용수중적권력실시과도투자；총경리여동사장량직겸임유리우강저과도투자행위，제고기업투자효솔。산품시장경쟁화외부대고동지고균능현저영향과도투자여관리층권력지간관계적민감성，외부대고동지고비중월고、산품시장경쟁월격렬，월능유효억제관리층이용권력실시과도투자적행위。
The board of listed firms with dispersed ownership cannot be expected to bargain fairly with managers.As a result, managers with strong power may engage in empire building which will lead to rent seeking by overinvestment.Due to such invest-ment inefficiency, managerial overinvestment can decrease the firm value and its shareholders′wealth.Effective external govern-ance mechanism plays a significant role in restricting the managerial rent seeking by overinvestment. In this paper, the product market competition and the ownership of outside blockholders are employed as proxies of external gov-ernance mechanism respectively.As important external governance mechanism, product market competition can affect the man-agement supervision of shareholders, and provide additional information used to mitigate moral hazard and agency costs.In re-turn, it will constraint the excessive expansion of managerial power and the managerial rent seeking.Compared with other share-holders, outside blockholders have both motivation and ability to supervise the managerial behavior.The higher the ownership of outside blockholders is, the more supervision of outside blockholders will lead to less managerial rent seeking. This paper investigates the impact of managerial power on overinvestment and the impacts of product market competition and own-ership of outside blockholders on overinvestment-managerial power sensitivity.Our sample includes listed firms on China′s main board market during the period from 2006 to 2013.We employ Hirshmann-Herfindahl index as measurement of product market competition, and ownership of the second largest shareholder to the fifth largest shareholder as measurement of outside blockhold-ers′ownership.And we use univariate analysis and multivariate regression analysis method to do the empirical analysis. The results show that the comprehensive managerial power has significantly positive impacts on the overinvestment of listed Chi-nese firms provided not taking into the account of the impacts of product market competition and ownership of outside blockholde-rs.It indicates that mangers with stronger power are more likely to engage in the overinvestment to extract private interests.The managers with longer tenure or higher education background, or the managers who own stake are more likely to seek rents by overinvestment;while the duality of a manager and a chairman has strong negative impacts on overinvestment.This paper does not come to the conclusion that there is significant relationship between overinvestment and board independence. The results also show that both product market competition and ownership of outside blockholders have significantly influences on overinvestment-managerial power sensitivity.The higher ownership of outside blockholders and stronger product market competi-tion can reduce managerial overinvestment.The results suggest that both product market competition and ownership of outside blockholders can decrease managerial overinvestment and improve investment efficiency of the listed Chinese firms.