CAJ | 학술논문

职业生涯关注与在职消费同属企业高管隐性激励体系中的重要部分，两者不仅存在潜在的替代关系，也可能受到企业的委托代理关系和企业所处的市场环境的影响。在激励机制的理论框架下，选取2005年至2013年中国非金融类上市企业作为样本，以企业产权性质和所在省份的政府行为规范化指数等量化指标作为调节性因素，构建多元线性回归模型；按同年度、同行业的在职消费四分位水平进行组别划分，构建分类Logistic回归模型，以验证假设，并从测度方式和替代性情景两个角度实施测试，以保证研究结论稳健成立。研究结果表明，基于职业生涯关注的隐性激励减弱时，上市企业高管会寻求更多的在职消费；在具备国有产权性质和身处政府行为规范化程度较低地区的上市企业中，职业生涯关注激励与在职消费的替代关系更加突出。研究结论对深入认识代理问题、优化激励契约具有重要意义和启示。
직업생애관주여재직소비동속기업고관은성격려체계중적중요부분，량자불부존재잠재적체대관계，야가능수도기업적위탁대리관계화기업소처적시장배경적영향。재격려궤제적이론광가하，선취2005년지2013년중국비금융류상시기업작위양본，이기업산권성질화소재성빈적정부행위규범화지수등양화지표작위조절성인소，구건다원선성회귀모형；안동년도、동행업적재직소비사분위수평진행조별화분，구건분류Logistic회귀모형，이험증가설，병종측도방식화체대성정경량개각도실시측시，이보증연구결론은건성립。연구결과표명，기우직업생애관주적은성격려감약시，상시기업고관회심구경다적재직소비；재구비국유산권성질화신처정부행위규범화정도교저지구적상시기업중，직업생애관주격려여재직소비적체대관계경가돌출。연구결론대심입인식대리문제、우화격려계약구유중요의의화계시。
The perk of the management, which is widely found in China, draws attention of academic circles and the whole socie-ty.It is not only a part of the problem of agency, but also a part of incentive contracts.An incentive contract is a combination of several sub-contracts, which are substitutable by one another.Both the career concerns and perk of the management are crucial part of incentive contracts.When career concerns incentive is weakened, perk of the management will be more prominent.What′s more, the substitution relation between those two components will be significantly influenced by property rights and standardized governmental behaviour. Using non-financial listed firms in China from 2005 to 2013 as samples, as well as nature of property rights and standardized gov-ernmental behaviour as moderator factors, we build a multiple linear regression model and a binomial Logistic regression model to verify the above assumptions.After robust tests by revising measurement and adopting an alternative scenario, the research con-clusion is still valid.The paper finds that: ①the management would seek for more perk if their career concerns incentive is weakened;②the substitution relation is more prominent in SOEs and corporations located in areas of low standardized govern-mental behaviour. The paper contributes to prior literature as follows.First and foremost, we verify the substitution relation between two implicit in-centive contracts and enrich relative studies on relationship between sub incentive contracts.By contrast, prior studies rarely no-tice that it is more difficult for senior executives to choose explicit incentive contracts as substitutable arrangements, for that im-plicit contracts are usually principle-oriented rather than rule-oriented.With more space to manipulate their performance, senior executives will surely prefer to adopt more perk when they approach the retirement age in order to maintain their utility.Second-ly , we fully consider the institutional background with strong demand of promotion for senior executives in SOEs and the economic setting of unbalanced development of regional economy in China.The results show that the substitution relation between career concerns incentive and perk of the management is more significant in SOEs and companies located in areas with lower regional marketization degree.Hence, this paper provides reasonable explanations for the cause of perk and why it is pervasive in SOEs and areas with lower regional marketization degree.The result would be of great significance and enlightenment to deepen the un-derstanding of agency problem and to optimize incentive contracts.