CAJ | 학술논문

文章以两任务委托代理模型考察了政治关联对经营者收益、投资者收益和社会福利的影响，得出政治关联虽然有利于经营者收益，但对投资者收益和社会福利有消极经济影响的理论分析结论。在此基础上，通过收集我国上市公司在银行间债券市场发行短期融资券、中期票据以及在股票市场公开增发股票的数据，实证研究验证了理论结论。文章从模型分析和经验研究方面丰富了有关政治关联对企业绩效影响的相关研究领域文献，对进一步发挥市场配置资源具有一定实践和政策启示。
문장이량임무위탁대리모형고찰료정치관련대경영자수익、투자자수익화사회복리적영향，득출정치관련수연유리우경영자수익，단대투자자수익화사회복리유소겁경제영향적이론분석결론。재차기출상，통과수집아국상시공사재은행간채권시장발행단기융자권、중기표거이급재고표시장공개증발고표적수거，실증연구험증료이론결론。문장종모형분석화경험연구방면봉부료유관정치관련대기업적효영향적상관연구영역문헌，대진일보발휘시장배치자원구유일정실천화정책계시。
By applying the Two-Task Principal Agent Theoretical Model, this paper showed that the polit-ical connection benefits the operators’ revenue, but negatively influences the investors’ income and the social welfare. That the political connections significantly decreased the corporate capital allocation e?ciency and the enterprise lowered the level of ROE was proved by utilizing a manually constructed database of the listed companies issuing the short-term financing bonds and medium-term notes in the inter-bank bond market and publicly issuing stock in the stock market. This paper furthered the research in political connection and firms’ performance. Moreover, it is of direct policy implications in exploiting market potentials in resources allocation.