工业技术经济
工業技術經濟
공업기술경제
INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGY & ECONOMY
2015年
8期
40-49
,共10页
上市公司%企业生命周期%R&D投入%影响因素%调节作用
上市公司%企業生命週期%R&D投入%影響因素%調節作用
상시공사%기업생명주기%R&D투입%영향인소%조절작용
listed company%enterprise life cycle%R&D input%effect factors%moderating effect
以中国A股主板制造业上市公司为样本,实证检验生命周期不同阶段企业规模、债务水平、国有控股、股权集中度、管理层持股、董事长与总经理两职设置状况与R&D投入的关系,研究结果证实:大企业比小企业更有利于R&D投入;负债对R&D投入具有制约作用;股权集中有利于R&D投入。国有控股、管理层持股、董事长与总经理两职设置状况与R&D投入的关系受企业生命周期的调节,在企业成长和成熟阶段,国有控股不利于R&D投入,而在企业衰退阶段,国有控股有利于R&D投入;在企业成熟阶段,管理层股权激励不利于R&D投入,而在衰退阶段,管理层股权激励对R&D投入有促进作用;在企业成长阶段,“两职”合一可能有利于R&D投入,在成熟和衰退阶段,“两职”分离更有利于R&D投入。
以中國A股主闆製造業上市公司為樣本,實證檢驗生命週期不同階段企業規模、債務水平、國有控股、股權集中度、管理層持股、董事長與總經理兩職設置狀況與R&D投入的關繫,研究結果證實:大企業比小企業更有利于R&D投入;負債對R&D投入具有製約作用;股權集中有利于R&D投入。國有控股、管理層持股、董事長與總經理兩職設置狀況與R&D投入的關繫受企業生命週期的調節,在企業成長和成熟階段,國有控股不利于R&D投入,而在企業衰退階段,國有控股有利于R&D投入;在企業成熟階段,管理層股權激勵不利于R&D投入,而在衰退階段,管理層股權激勵對R&D投入有促進作用;在企業成長階段,“兩職”閤一可能有利于R&D投入,在成熟和衰退階段,“兩職”分離更有利于R&D投入。
이중국A고주판제조업상시공사위양본,실증검험생명주기불동계단기업규모、채무수평、국유공고、고권집중도、관리층지고、동사장여총경리량직설치상황여R&D투입적관계,연구결과증실:대기업비소기업경유리우R&D투입;부채대R&D투입구유제약작용;고권집중유리우R&D투입。국유공고、관리층지고、동사장여총경리량직설치상황여R&D투입적관계수기업생명주기적조절,재기업성장화성숙계단,국유공고불리우R&D투입,이재기업쇠퇴계단,국유공고유리우R&D투입;재기업성숙계단,관리층고권격려불리우R&D투입,이재쇠퇴계단,관리층고권격려대R&D투입유촉진작용;재기업성장계단,“량직”합일가능유리우R&D투입,재성숙화쇠퇴계단,“량직”분리경유리우R&D투입。
This paper tests the relationship between firm size , capital structure , ownership concentration , state-owned holdings , management equity , the position setting of Board Chair and CEO and R&D input in the different stage of enterprise life cycle based on the data of manufacturing company listed on A-shares market . The results show that large enterprises is more conducive to R&D investment than small ones;liabilities have restricted role in R&D investment;equity concentration is conducive to R&D;the relationship between state-owned holdings , management equity , position setting of Board Chair and CEO and R&D input are moderated by enterprise life cy-cle . In the enterprise growth stage and mature stage , the state-owned holding company is not conducive to enterprise R&D input , and in the decline stage , the advantages of state-owned holdings highlight . In the enterprise's maturity stage , management equity may encour-age managers behavior of creating firm empire which is not conducive to enterprise R&D investment , and in the decline phase , the man-agement equity has a promoting effect on R&D input . In the enterprise growth stage , combination of the position of Board Chair and CEO could help the enterprise R&D input and in the mature and decline phase , and the separation of the two positions has more advantage to en-terprise R&D input .