CAJ | 학술논문

针对模糊需求下的批发价格契约与协调问题，基于 Fehr 和 Schmidt 提出的不公平厌恶模型，构建了考虑零售商不公平厌恶的批发价格契约模型，并通过模型推导及数值实验分析了零售商不公平厌恶对其订货量以及供应链利润的影响。研究结果表明，随着零售商的不利不公平厌恶程度的增加，零售商的最优订货量及供应链利润均减小；随着零售商的有利不公平厌恶程度的增加，零售商的最优订货量及供应商利润均增加，且零售商利润和供应链总利润均先增后减；此外，批发价格契约在一定条件下可以实现供应链协调。
침대모호수구하적비발개격계약여협조문제，기우 Fehr 화 Schmidt 제출적불공평염악모형，구건료고필령수상불공평염악적비발개격계약모형，병통과모형추도급수치실험분석료령수상불공평염악대기정화량이급공응련리윤적영향。연구결과표명，수착령수상적불리불공평염악정도적증가，령수상적최우정화량급공응련리윤균감소；수착령수상적유리불공평염악정도적증가，령수상적최우정화량급공응상리윤균증가，차령수상리윤화공응련총리윤균선증후감；차외，비발개격계약재일정조건하가이실현공응련협조。
For the problem of wholesale price contract and coordination under fuzzy demand,a wholesale price contract model considering retailer′s inequity aversion was constructed based on the inequity aversion model proposed by Fehr and Schmidt.Then,the impacts of retailer′s inequity aversion on order quantity and supply chain profit were analyzed through model reasoning and numerical experiment.The results showed that retailer′s optimal order quantity and supply chain profit will decrease as retailer′s disadvantageous inequity aversion increases.Retailer′s order quantity and supplier′s profit will increase,and retailer′s profit as well as the total profit of whole supply chain will first increase and then decrease,as retailer′s advantageous inequity aversion increases.In addition,wholesale price contract can coordinate supply chain under certain conditions.