科技管理研究
科技管理研究
과기관리연구
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT RESEARCH
2015年
16期
100-105,114
,共7页
演化博弈%产学研合作%利益分配%复制动态%进化稳定性
縯化博弈%產學研閤作%利益分配%複製動態%進化穩定性
연화박혁%산학연합작%이익분배%복제동태%진화은정성
evolutionary game%research cooperation%distribution of benefits%replicator dynamics
应用有限理性假设下的演化博弈研究方法，引入额外收益分配系数、违约金的惩罚数额等因素构造产学研合作创新演化博弈模型并进行 Matlab 数值仿真模拟，判断策略的进化稳定性，分析产方和学研方的策略选择行为。研究结果表明：演化结果具有鲜明的路径依赖特征，取决于系统的初始状态，并与合作方从合作获得收益多少及收益能否得到公平分配和违约金的惩罚数额密切相关。因此，确定合理的违约金惩罚数额和分配系数的范围，才能保证产学研双方收敛于合作的稳定状态。
應用有限理性假設下的縯化博弈研究方法，引入額外收益分配繫數、違約金的懲罰數額等因素構造產學研閤作創新縯化博弈模型併進行 Matlab 數值倣真模擬，判斷策略的進化穩定性，分析產方和學研方的策略選擇行為。研究結果錶明：縯化結果具有鮮明的路徑依賴特徵，取決于繫統的初始狀態，併與閤作方從閤作穫得收益多少及收益能否得到公平分配和違約金的懲罰數額密切相關。因此，確定閤理的違約金懲罰數額和分配繫數的範圍，纔能保證產學研雙方收斂于閤作的穩定狀態。
응용유한이성가설하적연화박혁연구방법，인입액외수익분배계수、위약금적징벌수액등인소구조산학연합작창신연화박혁모형병진행 Matlab 수치방진모의，판단책략적진화은정성，분석산방화학연방적책략선택행위。연구결과표명：연화결과구유선명적로경의뢰특정，취결우계통적초시상태，병여합작방종합작획득수익다소급수익능부득도공평분배화위약금적징벌수액밀절상관。인차，학정합리적위약금징벌수액화분배계수적범위，재능보증산학연쌍방수렴우합작적은정상태。
This paper studies the application of evolutionary game method under the assumption of bounded rationality,in-troduces the additional income distribution coefficient,the amount of liquidated damages penalties and other factors to con-struct a cooperative innovation evolutionary game model,carries out numerical simulation matlab,determines the evolution-ary strategy stability,and analyzes the decision behaviors from the perspectives of producers and researchers .The results show that:the result has a distinct feature of evolutionary “path dependence”,which depends on the initial state of the sys-tem and is closely related to the income derived from cooperation with partners and a fair amount of punishment on liquida-ted damages.Therefore,a reasonable amount of punishment on liquidated damages and a rational allocation ratio,can en-sure convergence to the steady state of both production and research cooperation.
