CAJ | 학술논문

无论在实践上还是在理论上，是否参与国际货币政策协调都是一国货币当局所面对的难题。分析参与国际货币政策协调的一般框架是要明确参与协调的原则，收益与成本的构成，区分两种条件下的状况并确定其利润函数。通过对合作与不合作条件下国际货币政策协调的成本收益的分析表明，在一般情况下，一国参与国际货币政策协调是有利的；但在特殊情况下，即当合作成本非常高或不合作收益非常大的情况下，一国不参与协调是理性的选择。
무론재실천상환시재이론상，시부삼여국제화폐정책협조도시일국화폐당국소면대적난제。분석삼여국제화폐정책협조적일반광가시요명학삼여협조적원칙，수익여성본적구성，구분량충조건하적상황병학정기리윤함수。통과대합작여불합작조건하국제화폐정책협조적성본수익적분석표명，재일반정황하，일국삼여국제화폐정책협조시유리적；단재특수정황하，즉당합작성본비상고혹불합작수익비상대적정황하，일국불삼여협조시이성적선택。
Whether to participate in international monetary coordination is a difficult question for the monetary bureau to decide both in practice and in theory. This paper sets up a general analysis framework for international monetary coordination. According to the principle of cooperation benefit and by comparing the benefit and the cost on the condition of cooperation and non-cooperation, this paper concludes that it is useful for the monetary bureau to make a decision to participate in international monetary coordination.