财经研究
財經研究
재경연구
The Study of Finance and Economics
2006年
2期
90~97
,共null页
任职期限 激励 效率损失 权衡
任職期限 激勵 效率損失 權衡
임직기한 격려 효솔손실 권형
duration of leader position; incentive; efficiency loss; tradeoff
领导任职期限制度能激励个人在管理技能培养上进行投入,这有利于增加社会总剩余;然而,任职期限制度在提供激励的同时,也造成了潜在效率的损失。领导任职期限的设置是这二者之间权衡的结果。文章通过一个两阶段博弈的分析框架,利用动态的局部均衡权衡模型,从个人收益最大化和社会总剩余最大化的相互作用中,推导出了社会最优的领导任职期限。在此动态的局部均衡权衡模型中,个人投入水平是任职期限制度的内生产物。
領導任職期限製度能激勵箇人在管理技能培養上進行投入,這有利于增加社會總剩餘;然而,任職期限製度在提供激勵的同時,也造成瞭潛在效率的損失。領導任職期限的設置是這二者之間權衡的結果。文章通過一箇兩階段博弈的分析框架,利用動態的跼部均衡權衡模型,從箇人收益最大化和社會總剩餘最大化的相互作用中,推導齣瞭社會最優的領導任職期限。在此動態的跼部均衡權衡模型中,箇人投入水平是任職期限製度的內生產物。
령도임직기한제도능격려개인재관리기능배양상진행투입,저유리우증가사회총잉여;연이,임직기한제도재제공격려적동시,야조성료잠재효솔적손실。령도임직기한적설치시저이자지간권형적결과。문장통과일개량계단박혁적분석광가,이용동태적국부균형권형모형,종개인수익최대화화사회총잉여최대화적상호작용중,추도출료사회최우적령도임직기한。재차동태적국부균형권형모형중,개인투입수평시임직기한제도적내생산물。
The duration of leader position provides representative individual with the incentives to invest in educating management technology, which is helpful for increasing the total social surplus. However, the duration of leader position also results in the loss of potential efficiency simultaneously. The duration of leader position is a result of tradeoff between these twosides. Making use of an analytical framework of a two-stage game and the dynamic partial equilibrium tradeoff model, this paper deduces a society's optimal duration of leader position from the interaction between personal income maximization and total social surplus maximization. In our dynamic partial equilibrium tradeoff model, the level of individual investment is an inside outcome of the leader position system.