河南大学学报:社会科学版
河南大學學報:社會科學版
하남대학학보:사회과학판
Journal of Henan University(Social Science)
2006年
2期
60~65
,共null页
国有企业 经济激励 股票期权
國有企業 經濟激勵 股票期權
국유기업 경제격려 고표기권
the state-owned enterprise; economic incentive; stock option
国有企业“代理问题”的实质,是国家利益与国有企业经营者利益的关联度、国有企业经营者的动力和重构国有企业经营者激励约束机制等问题。对比分析固定收入制、年薪制和股票期权制等三种典型的薪酬激励方式,固定收入制不具有有效的激励作用;年薪制可以确保经营者的普通日常性努力经营行为,但不能保证经营者一定采取有利于企业长远利益的长期行为,更不能避免经营者的短期行为;股票期权制是激励经营者采取长期行为的有效激励方式,然而,现行的股票期权激励缺乏对企业经营者长期持股的约束。要建立内在化、动态化和长期化的激励机制,在激励方式上除了要突破收入分配限制,提高国有企业经营者的收入标准之外,更重要的是要制订更加有效的方案,给予企业经营者股票或股票期权,以股权激励的方式使其自身利益与股东利益及企业的长期发展结合起来。
國有企業“代理問題”的實質,是國傢利益與國有企業經營者利益的關聯度、國有企業經營者的動力和重構國有企業經營者激勵約束機製等問題。對比分析固定收入製、年薪製和股票期權製等三種典型的薪酬激勵方式,固定收入製不具有有效的激勵作用;年薪製可以確保經營者的普通日常性努力經營行為,但不能保證經營者一定採取有利于企業長遠利益的長期行為,更不能避免經營者的短期行為;股票期權製是激勵經營者採取長期行為的有效激勵方式,然而,現行的股票期權激勵缺乏對企業經營者長期持股的約束。要建立內在化、動態化和長期化的激勵機製,在激勵方式上除瞭要突破收入分配限製,提高國有企業經營者的收入標準之外,更重要的是要製訂更加有效的方案,給予企業經營者股票或股票期權,以股權激勵的方式使其自身利益與股東利益及企業的長期髮展結閤起來。
국유기업“대리문제”적실질,시국가이익여국유기업경영자이익적관련도、국유기업경영자적동력화중구국유기업경영자격려약속궤제등문제。대비분석고정수입제、년신제화고표기권제등삼충전형적신수격려방식,고정수입제불구유유효적격려작용;년신제가이학보경영자적보통일상성노력경영행위,단불능보증경영자일정채취유리우기업장원이익적장기행위,경불능피면경영자적단기행위;고표기권제시격려경영자채취장기행위적유효격려방식,연이,현행적고표기권격려결핍대기업경영자장기지고적약속。요건립내재화、동태화화장기화적격려궤제,재격려방식상제료요돌파수입분배한제,제고국유기업경영자적수입표준지외,경중요적시요제정경가유효적방안,급여기업경영자고표혹고표기권,이고권격려적방식사기자신이익여고동이익급기업적장기발전결합기래。
The essence of the state-owned enterprise's agent problem lies in the relation between the national profit and the manager's profit of the state-owned enterprise, in the incentive of the state-owned enterprise's manager and in the issue to reconstruct the incentive-restrictive system of the state-owned enterprise's manager. We compare and analyze the effects of the following three typical salary incentive patterns, namely, fixed income pattern, annual salary pattern and stock option pattern on the manager's behavior. We conclude that the fixed income pattern isn't of effective incentive, that the annual salary pattern may guarantee the ordinary, daily behavior of the manager, but couldn't guarantee the manager to adopt the long- term behavior absolutely which is good for the enterprise's strategic profit, even prohibits the manager from short- term behavior, and that the stock option pattern is the effective incentive pattern that guarantees the manager to adopt long-term behavior, but it isn't restrictive for the managers to hold their stocks long. In order to create the inherent, dynamic and long incentive system, besides breaking the income distribution constrict in incentive pattern and improving the income criterion of the state- owned enterprise's manager, the more important thing is to make more effective plan and to give the manager stock or stock option, which makes them connect their own profit with the stockholders'profit and the enterprise's long-term development.