CAJ | 학술논문

当前，我国国有企业改革中最重要的问题是在公司治理模式中缺少职工的有效监督作用。从而导致国有资产大量流失，阻碍国有企业改革的深化与推进。通过建立一个简单数理模型．本文证明现有国有企业治理结构在不能解决有效监督的前提下。对企业管理者的“激励机制”可能成为“逆向激励”。将职工监督机制引入监督模型能很好地解决这一难题。本文还探讨了职工行使控制权的理论依据。并以德国的“参与制”进行经验检验一从理论与实践两方面论证职工各剩余控制权的可能性与可行性。
당전，아국국유기업개혁중최중요적문제시재공사치리모식중결소직공적유효감독작용。종이도치국유자산대량류실，조애국유기업개혁적심화여추진。통과건립일개간단수리모형．본문증명현유국유기업치리결구재불능해결유효감독적전제하。대기업관리자적“격려궤제”가능성위“역향격려”。장직공감독궤제인입감독모형능흔호지해결저일난제。본문환탐토료직공행사공제권적이론의거。병이덕국적“삼여제”진행경험검험일종이론여실천량방면론증직공각잉여공제권적가능성여가행성。
The most important problem in our SOE reform is short of effective supervision of workers in the corporate governance, which causes the runoff of state-owned property in great quantities in some enterprises and obstructs the reform of SOE. Based on a simple model, we find that the incentive mechanism may become adverse in the absence of effective monitoring and supervision in the current state. The key premise we propose is that introducing workers＇ supervision to monitoring function would provide a new perspective and solution of the current principal-agent problem. We also address the theoretical basis for workers＇ control enforcement and make the empirical analysis by taking German eodetermination as a study ease, wherein we examine the probability and feasibility of workers＇ residual control rights separately from theoretical and practice aspect .