CAJ | 학술논문

通过构造博弈模型，分析成熟市场条件下双寡头企业之间的广告投资决策。考虑企业通过广告投资活动对消费者的偏好产生作用，不同企业的广告具有对产品价格产生程度不同的影响，在双寡头同时确定广告投资的决策条件下，当广告影响因子与广告壁垒存在一定的关系下企业加大广告投资才是理性的，同时分析了效率因子及投入壁垒对利润的影响。
통과구조박혁모형，분석성숙시장조건하쌍과두기업지간적엄고투자결책。고필기업통과엄고투자활동대소비자적편호산생작용，불동기업적엄고구유대산품개격산생정도불동적영향，재쌍과두동시학정엄고투자적결책조건하，당엄고영향인자여엄고벽루존재일정적관계하기업가대엄고투자재시이성적，동시분석료효솔인자급투입벽루대리윤적영향。
This paper forms the model of game theory to study the advertising investment strategy of two companies separately in the mature oligarch market, and provides theoretical support for the investment in advertising of enterprise. With the persuading effects of advertisement, enterprise makes different price of products through different advertising activity. This paper provides strategy of advertisement investment in the simultaneous-move game, judging from the comparison of the result got from the paper and the result of Cournot equilibrium. The paper concludes that enterprises have possibilities of advertising by the influence of the efficiency factor; otherwise, the investment will consume the profits rather than make profits for the enterprise. Meanwhile, the authors analyze the influence on profits, which is put by the efficiency factor in making price.