科技进步与对策
科技進步與對策
과기진보여대책
Science & Technology Progress and Policy
2006年
11期
34~37
,共null页
胡明礼 刘思峰 方志耕 阮爱清
鬍明禮 劉思峰 方誌耕 阮愛清
호명례 류사봉 방지경 원애청
企业集群 进化博弈链模型 仿真 临界条件
企業集群 進化博弈鏈模型 倣真 臨界條件
기업집군 진화박혁련모형 방진 림계조건
clusters ; chain model of evolutionary game ; imitation ; critical condition
构建了企业集群的进化博弈链模型,利用该模型对进入效用为负值的情形下企业集群进化博弈演进过程进行系统仿真,提出了企业集群演进的临界条件和自发演进条件的概念。揭示了企业集群演进的内在机理和动态过程,为探寻企业集群演进的本质规律提供了新的思路和方法。
構建瞭企業集群的進化博弈鏈模型,利用該模型對進入效用為負值的情形下企業集群進化博弈縯進過程進行繫統倣真,提齣瞭企業集群縯進的臨界條件和自髮縯進條件的概唸。揭示瞭企業集群縯進的內在機理和動態過程,為探尋企業集群縯進的本質規律提供瞭新的思路和方法。
구건료기업집군적진화박혁련모형,이용해모형대진입효용위부치적정형하기업집군진화박혁연진과정진행계통방진,제출료기업집군연진적림계조건화자발연진조건적개념。게시료기업집군연진적내재궤리화동태과정,위탐심기업집군연진적본질규률제공료신적사로화방법。
It is the result of repeat games among lots of bounded rational enterprises that clusters' evolution process, such as forming, development, grown up and decline of clusters. Evolutionary game theory is the basis of tools to describe this kind of problem. Chain model of evolutionary game, the latest fruit of evolutionary game theory,is more vivid and easier to imitate than classical models. In this paper,a chain model of evolutionary game of clusters' evolution is established to imitate the evolutionary process of clusters with negative entry utility. By the result of imitation, two novel concepts, i.e. critical condition and spontaneous condition of clusters' evolution are put forward to discover the inherent mechanism and dynamic process of clusters' evolution. The research of this paper provides a new way to explore essential rules of cluster's evolution.