CAJ | 학술논문

企业环境污染造成的外部性利用市场机制已很难解决，政府规制的介入就成为一种必然。作为理性的决策主体，它们在一定条件下成为一种博弈关系，从二者的博弈均衡时得出的最优混合策略，可以看到博弈双方行为的选择都与对方的成本收益有关；另外，政府对企业提高污染的罚款额，不能从根本上完全消除污染，环境污染具有社会成本，政府规制也具有社会成本，只有将二者降到最低状态时，才能使污染控制给整个社会带来最大收益。
기업배경오염조성적외부성이용시장궤제이흔난해결，정부규제적개입취성위일충필연。작위이성적결책주체，타문재일정조건하성위일충박혁관계，종이자적박혁균형시득출적최우혼합책략，가이간도박혁쌍방행위적선택도여대방적성본수익유관；령외，정부대기업제고오염적벌관액，불능종근본상완전소제오염，배경오염구유사회성본，정부규제야구유사회성본，지유장이자강도최저상태시，재능사오염공제급정개사회대래최대수익。
The paper argues that it has become necessary for the government to intervene by means of its regulation so as to solve the problem of environmental pollution, as it is difficult for the corporate alone to deal with the external problems involved. As rational decision makers, both the corporate and the government develop into a relationship of game players under certain circumstances. Through the optimal mixed strategy resulted from game equilibrium, we can see that either of the two players chooses its action depending on the Benefit-Cost analysis of its adversary. Government＇ increase of fines does not help to eliminate pollution thoroughly except for some short term effect. As is true of environment pollution, government regulation also entails certain social costs. Only when the social costs from both sides are reduced to the minimum can pollution control achieves maximum benefits for the whole society.