CAJ | 학술논문

基于委托代理理论，将信息不对称条件下的企业内部代理成本和监督成本等同于激励成本，并构造出一个企业内部激励成本理论模型，在对模型分析的基础上，给出了激励有效性边界条件，并得出结论：对风险厌恶型代理人来说，激励一般是无效的；对风险偏好型代理人，只有监督程度较高、可置信的惩罚力度较大，代理人自身成本较低，激励才可能是有效的；同时要避免激励的无效，必须给定代理人一定的固定报酬。
기우위탁대리이론，장신식불대칭조건하적기업내부대리성본화감독성본등동우격려성본，병구조출일개기업내부격려성본이론모형，재대모형분석적기출상，급출료격려유효성변계조건，병득출결론：대풍험염악형대리인래설，격려일반시무효적；대풍험편호형대리인，지유감독정도교고、가치신적징벌력도교대，대리인자신성본교저，격려재가능시유효적；동시요피면격려적무효，필수급정대리인일정적고정보수。
In this paper, the sum of the agent cost and supervisor cost is equated to incentive cost in the enterprise with asymmetric information based on the theory of principal - agent. Then a theoretic model of incentive cost in the firm is set up and analyzed, and the condition of effectiveness of incentive is hold. In the end, the conclusion is draw that the incentive is ineffective to the agent of averse rise and the incentive is effective to the agent of prefer rise, when supervisory mechanism is more perfect, and punishment is higher and the agency＇s cost is lower, and that it is necessary to provide a base reward to the agent to avoid the incentive ineffective.