CAJ | 학술논문

本文通过建立风险投资家与风险企业家行为策略的动态博弈模型，对风险企业家的激励机制、风险投资家监控机制及其相关关系进行了分析，得出从风险企业家角度，监控机制与激励合同具有互补性；从风险投资家角度，监控机制与激励合同具有替代性的研究结论。论文还结合参数分析，对影响最优激励强度与综合监控强度的变动因素进行了系统研究。
본문통과건립풍험투자가여풍험기업가행위책략적동태박혁모형，대풍험기업가적격려궤제、풍험투자가감공궤제급기상관관계진행료분석，득출종풍험기업가각도，감공궤제여격려합동구유호보성；종풍험투자가각도，감공궤제여격려합동구유체대성적연구결론。논문환결합삼수분석，대영향최우격려강도여종합감공강도적변동인소진행료계통연구。
A dynamic game model on the action strategies between venture entrepreneur and venture capitalist is built. Based on the model, an analysis on the incentive mechanism for the venture entrepreneur, monitor mechanism of the venture capitalist and correlation is made. It is concluded that from the aspect of the venture entrepreneur, the monitor mechanism and the incentive contract is complement; but from the aspect of the venture capitalist, the monitor mechanism and the incentive contract is alternative. Then combining with the parameter analysis, the variable factors between the best incentive strength and the generalized monitor strength is researched.