CAJ | 학술논문

本文以中国上市公司1999—2002年4年期间实施的185起涉及金额超过1亿元的大型并购事件为样本对上市公司管理者的行为进行研究。实证分析结果表明，自由现金流量愈充足，管理者倾向于通过并购等活动把自由现金浪费在低效的投资项目上；企业的负债水平对管理者的行为没有显著的约束作用。这表明中国上市公司存在着代理成本问题。
본문이중국상시공사1999—2002년4년기간실시적185기섭급금액초과1억원적대형병구사건위양본대상시공사관리자적행위진행연구。실증분석결과표명，자유현금류량유충족，관리자경향우통과병구등활동파자유현금낭비재저효적투자항목상；기업적부채수평대관리자적행위몰유현저적약속작용。저표명중국상시공사존재착대리성본문제。
This essay investigates the behavior of top management of listed firms by using a sample of 185 firms that has accomplished acquisitions with a value in excess of 100 millions Yuan between 1999 and 2002. The resuits of the study indicate that the managers of listed firms with adequate free cash flow are more likely to be involved in value-destroying mergers and acquisitions. Debt-to-equity ratio has no significant constraint on managers＇ behavior. The empirical research shows that listed firms are significantly affected by agency costs measures.