北京工商大学学报：社会科学版
北京工商大學學報：社會科學版
북경공상대학학보：사회과학판
JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS UNIVERSITY
2007年
3期
21~26
,共null页
特许经营权 拍卖 激励性合约 双重或第二货源 承诺 合谋
特許經營權 拍賣 激勵性閤約 雙重或第二貨源 承諾 閤謀
특허경영권 박매 격려성합약 쌍중혹제이화원 승낙 합모
franchise; auction; incentive contract; dual or second sourcing; commitment and collusion
本文阐述了自然垄断产业中的政府规制的激励问题。主要从激励性合约的最优拍卖、激励性合约中的双重或第二货源、承诺和合谋问题等四个方面,综述了特许经营权拍卖中的激励性合约理论的产生、演变和研究的进展。
本文闡述瞭自然壟斷產業中的政府規製的激勵問題。主要從激勵性閤約的最優拍賣、激勵性閤約中的雙重或第二貨源、承諾和閤謀問題等四箇方麵,綜述瞭特許經營權拍賣中的激勵性閤約理論的產生、縯變和研究的進展。
본문천술료자연롱단산업중적정부규제적격려문제。주요종격려성합약적최우박매、격려성합약중적쌍중혹제이화원、승낙화합모문제등사개방면,종술료특허경영권박매중적격려성합약이론적산생、연변화연구적진전。
This article analyses the incentive problem of governmental regulation in the industry of natural monopoly. It is studied mainly in such four aspects of incentive contract as optimal auction, dual or second sourcing, commitment and collusion. And a summary is made on the birth and evolution of the incentive contract theory in franchise as well as the progress of the study.
