CAJ | 학술논문

本文基于有限理性与信息不对称框架，建立了一个企业并购的一般性信号博彝模型。模型表明，股权并购交易价格受目标企业资产质量、造假成本、并购企业调查成本、并购市场调查效率及买卖双方机会成本等因素的共同影响。建立高效、公平的市场体系，大幅度提高造假成本或建立完备而高效的信用体系，具有显著而理想的效果；足够大的造假成本或市场调查的高效率不仅可以保证市场配置资源的效率而且可以保证最好的交易公平性；但在一个不具有高效而完备信用体系且对造假者缺乏严厉惩处机制的市场里。改进并购市场调查效率或小幅提高造假成本反而可能对市场配置资源的效率形成伤害。
본문기우유한이성여신식불대칭광가，건립료일개기업병구적일반성신호박이모형。모형표명，고권병구교역개격수목표기업자산질량、조가성본、병구기업조사성본、병구시장조사효솔급매매쌍방궤회성본등인소적공동영향。건립고효、공평적시장체계，대폭도제고조가성본혹건립완비이고효적신용체계，구유현저이이상적효과；족구대적조가성본혹시장조사적고효솔불부가이보증시장배치자원적효솔이차가이보증최호적교역공평성；단재일개불구유고효이완비신용체계차대조가자결핍엄려징처궤제적시장리。개진병구시장조사효솔혹소폭제고조가성본반이가능대시장배치자원적효솔형성상해。
This article developed a pricing model for M＆A based on bounded rationality and asymmetric information. The main conclusions are as follows： the equilibrium price for M＆A is related to the quality, costs for skullduggery, and the investigation efficiency for the goal company; enough costs for skullduggery can not only improve the efficiency for material allocation, but also result in a fairly trading; but in the market where costs for skullduggery are relatively low, improving investigation efficiency or slightly increasing costs for skullduggery will lead to a low trading efficiency.