CAJ | 학술논문

通过波特和劳勒的外在和内在奖酬激励理论对家族企业与职业经理人之间的委托-代理模型进行修正，旨在进一步合理化，完善家族企业与经理人之间的契约合同，为家族企业找到解决家族困境问题的办法提供新的思路。不仅将外在报酬激励因素带入模型，而且尝试将波特和劳勒激励理论中的内在报酬激励因素纳入家族企业与职业经理人之间委托-代理关系模型中加以研究，通过对委托-代理模型的分析和修正，得出强化内在奖酬激励因素能有效降低委托代理成本。
통과파특화로륵적외재화내재장수격려이론대가족기업여직업경리인지간적위탁-대리모형진행수정，지재진일보합이화，완선가족기업여경리인지간적계약합동，위가족기업조도해결가족곤경문제적판법제공신적사로。불부장외재보수격려인소대입모형，이차상시장파특화로륵격려이론중적내재보수격려인소납입가족기업여직업경리인지간위탁-대리관계모형중가이연구，통과대위탁-대리모형적분석화수정，득출강화내재장수격려인소능유효강저위탁대리성본。
This paper modifies the trust-agent model between family enterprises and professional manag- ers through Port and Lawler＇ s theory of exterior and interior incentive in order to find new solutions to the diffi-culties family enterprises find them in by further rationalizing and perfecting the contract between family enter-prises and managers. In addition to extrinsic remuneration incentives, the intrinsic reward incentives in Port and Lawler＇ s theory is also studied in the modified trust-agent model. By analyzing and modifying the mod-el, it is concluded that trust-agent cost can be significantly reduced by strengthening the intrinsic reward incentives.