CAJ | 학술논문

关于风险投资退出机制的研究主要集中在对首次公开发行（IPO）上,且现存的文献大多认为IPO是风险投资退出方式中的最佳方式.但是也有一些学者认为并购方式（M＆A）在总体绩效上要优于IPO,仅在企业家激励效应方面逊于IPO.论文比较了风险投资主要退出机制,深入探讨了企业家激励效应问题,最后综合企业家控制权激励和财务利益两方面的因素建立数学模型.模型最终表明：只要为企业家提供足够的财务补偿,并购方式也可以成为激励企业家的有效方式.
관우풍험투자퇴출궤제적연구주요집중재대수차공개발행（IPO）상,차현존적문헌대다인위IPO시풍험투자퇴출방식중적최가방식.단시야유일사학자인위병구방식（M＆A）재총체적효상요우우IPO,부재기업가격려효응방면손우IPO.논문비교료풍험투자주요퇴출궤제,심입탐토료기업가격려효응문제,최후종합기업가공제권격려화재무이익량방면적인소건립수학모형.모형최종표명：지요위기업가제공족구적재무보상,병구방식야가이성위격려기업가적유효방식.
　It is generally believed in the Venture Capital（VC） literature that Initial Public Offering（IPO） is the optimal exit choice and the extant researches mainly focus on IPOs.Some researchers,however,believe that Mergers and Acquisitions（M＆A） behave better than IPO on the whole,while M＆A is inferior to IPO in entrepreneurial motivation.This paper compares the main VC exit choices in the beginning,discusses in depth the issue of entrepreneurial motivation in the following and introduces a mathematical model which considers both control benefits and financial benefits in the end.The model demonstrates that as long as the entrepreneurs get enough paid,M＆A might also be effective ways to motivate entrepreneurs.