CAJ | 학술논문

本文试图解释标会会案的发生机制。作者指出职业会首作为实际的金融存贷中介因担心挤兑而较少采用“说坏话”机制，相反他们可能有信息屏蔽动机。他们可通过发信号来吸收会员。我们证明了一种标会套利的可能性。如果很多人进行标会套利会使标会数量剧增，导致会息飙升。标会退出条款的缺失及标会多人、分期、多轮的履约方式使标会成员退出成本高，当标息超过特定水平后他们的理性选择就是抢标和组织新会。人们对标会套利行为信息不足，从而对其中的风险缺乏认识可能是标会会案爆发的深层原因。
본문시도해석표회회안적발생궤제。작자지출직업회수작위실제적금융존대중개인담심제태이교소채용“설배화”궤제，상반타문가능유신식병폐동궤。타문가통과발신호래흡수회원。아문증명료일충표회투리적가능성。여과흔다인진행표회투리회사표회수량극증，도치회식표승。표회퇴출조관적결실급표회다인、분기、다륜적리약방식사표회성원퇴출성본고，당표식초과특정수평후타문적이성선택취시창표화조직신회。인문대표회투리행위신식불족，종이대기중적풍험결핍인식가능시표회회안폭발적심층원인。
The paper intends to explain the dynamics of massive failure of bidding-ROSCAs in this paper. As a financial intermediary, the professional bidding-ROSCA owner is less likely to use ＂gossip＂ mechanism to control risk for fear of a possible ＂bank run＂. Contrarily, the owner has the incentive to hide negative information. Signaling can be used to contract potential ROSCA members who may anticipate owner＇s information-hiding incentive. It is proved that there are arbitrage opportunities among bidding-ROSCAs and such opportunities may increase the number and interest rate of bidding-ROSCAs. As the absence of exit clause and the multi-rounds operation rule in bidding-ROSCA, ROSCA members has to pay higher exit cost. So when facing an exorbitantly high interest rate, a rational ROSCA member will strive for the next bid and raise new ROSCAs to manage risk. Therefore, the authors conclude＂ that the inadequate information about risks involving in bidding-ROSCAs arbitrage may be the fundamental reason for massive failure of bidding-ROSCAs.