CAJ | 학술논문

本文采用共同代理模型，结合我国国有公司独特的治理背景．在股东中心主义的理论基础上，运用分布参数模型法求解最优的国有公司经理努力水平。讨论了国有股东效用组成、股权结构和激励机制等因素对最优的经理努力水平的影响。研究发现，国有公司股权需要一定的集中度．但并不应该人为规定股权比例，激励与努力不存在单调关系，激励机制的效果取决于多种激励手段的综合运用。
본문채용공동대리모형，결합아국국유공사독특적치리배경．재고동중심주의적이론기출상，운용분포삼수모형법구해최우적국유공사경리노력수평。토론료국유고동효용조성、고권결구화격려궤제등인소대최우적경리노력수평적영향。연구발현，국유공사고권수요일정적집중도．단병불응해인위규정고권비례，격려여노력불존재단조관계，격려궤제적효과취결우다충격려수단적종합운용。
In this paper ,we set up a common agency model, which is based on the theory of shareholder governance consider with the background of Chinese state-owned corporate, and use the parameterized distribution formulation to find out the manager＇ s maximal effort .Then ,we discuss the influence of the following ingredients for the equilibrium solution, such as the state-owned shareholder＇ s component of utility, the structure of share and the incentive institution .We find that the share structure of SOE need some concentration and its not necessary to set a equality ratio ,meanwhile the discussion show that incentive is not monotonous with the manager＇ s effort.