南开管理评论
南開管理評論
남개관리평론
Nankai Business Review
2008年
1期
15~23
,共null页
控制权 现金流权 现金持有量 终极控股股东
控製權 現金流權 現金持有量 終極控股股東
공제권 현금류권 현금지유량 종겁공고고동
Control Rights; Cash Flow Rights; Cash Holdings; Ultimate Controlling Shareholders
文章以我国资本市场2002年非金融类A股公司为样本，实证研究了终极控股股东控制权与现金流权分离对公司现金持有量水平及其市场价值的影响。研究结果发现：（1）当终极控股股东为国有股东时．控制权／现金流权系数与现金持有量水平显著正相关；而当终极控股股东为非国有股东时，控制权／现金流权系数与现金持有量水平虽然正相关，但不能通过显著性检验。表明在两权分离的情况下，国有终极控股股东对高现金持有量水平具有较高的偏好；（2）当终极控股股东为国有股东，且其控制权与现金流权存在分离时，现金持有量的价值为0．769元；而当终极控股股东控制权与现金流权不存在分离或虽存在分离但终极控股股东为非国有股东时．现金持有量的价值为1．206元。从而表明在两权分离的情况下，国有终极控股股东对高现金持有量水平的偏好是一种控股股东利益侵占动机。
文章以我國資本市場2002年非金融類A股公司為樣本，實證研究瞭終極控股股東控製權與現金流權分離對公司現金持有量水平及其市場價值的影響。研究結果髮現：（1）噹終極控股股東為國有股東時．控製權／現金流權繫數與現金持有量水平顯著正相關；而噹終極控股股東為非國有股東時，控製權／現金流權繫數與現金持有量水平雖然正相關，但不能通過顯著性檢驗。錶明在兩權分離的情況下，國有終極控股股東對高現金持有量水平具有較高的偏好；（2）噹終極控股股東為國有股東，且其控製權與現金流權存在分離時，現金持有量的價值為0．769元；而噹終極控股股東控製權與現金流權不存在分離或雖存在分離但終極控股股東為非國有股東時．現金持有量的價值為1．206元。從而錶明在兩權分離的情況下，國有終極控股股東對高現金持有量水平的偏好是一種控股股東利益侵佔動機。
문장이아국자본시장2002년비금융류A고공사위양본，실증연구료종겁공고고동공제권여현금류권분리대공사현금지유량수평급기시장개치적영향。연구결과발현：（1）당종겁공고고동위국유고동시．공제권／현금류권계수여현금지유량수평현저정상관；이당종겁공고고동위비국유고동시，공제권／현금류권계수여현금지유량수평수연정상관，단불능통과현저성검험。표명재량권분리적정황하，국유종겁공고고동대고현금지유량수평구유교고적편호；（2）당종겁공고고동위국유고동，차기공제권여현금류권존재분리시，현금지유량적개치위0．769원；이당종겁공고고동공제권여현금류권불존재분리혹수존재분리단종겁공고고동위비국유고동시．현금지유량적개치위1．206원。종이표명재량권분리적정황하，국유종겁공고고동대고현금지유량수평적편호시일충공고고동이익침점동궤。
In this paper, we investigate the impact of the separation of control rights from cash flow rights of ultimate controlling shareholders on firm value under the settings of concentrated ownership structure by focusing on the effect of the separation of the two rights on the market value of corporate cash holdings. We first construct an index of the separation of control rights from cash rights of ultimate controlling shareholders using the 2002-year-end data from A-share listed companies in China; we then empirically examine the effects of the separation of control rights from cash flow rights of ultimate controlling shareholders on the level and value of corporate cash holdings. The empirical results show： （1） after controlling the effects of other factors that influence the level of corporate cash holdings, the ratio of control rights to cash flow rights is positively related to the level of corporate cash holdings when the ultimate shareholders are state shareholders; however, the ratio of control rights to cash flow rights is not significantly related to the level of corporate cash holdings when the ultimate controlling shareholders are non-state shareholders. These results show that state ultimate controlling shareholders show higher preference for large corporate cash holdings; （2） The value of corporate cash hold- ings is about￥0.769 when the ratio of control rights to cash flow rights is above 1 and the ultimate controlling shareholders are state shareholders; but it is about ￥ 1.206 when the ratio of control rights to cash flow rights is equal to 1 or above 1 but the ultimate controlling shareholders are non-state shareholders. These results show that the higher preference for large cash holdings of state ultimate controlling shareholders is a kind of motive for expropriation under the context of the separation of control rights from cash flow rights. These results are consistent with the ＂grabbing hand＂ hypothesis advanced by Shleifer and Vishny.
