南开管理评论
南開管理評論
남개관리평론
Nankai Business Review
2008年
1期
39~47
,共null页
资苓结构 公司治理 代理成本
資苓結構 公司治理 代理成本
자령결구 공사치리 대리성본
Capital Structure; Corporate Governance; Agency Costs
资本结构如何影响代理成本是资本结构研究的一个重要领域。本文以2000-2005年国有控股上市公司和民营上市公司为研究对象,通过对这一问题的实证分析发现,控股股东持股比例与民营上市公司代理成本负相关,而与国有控股上市公司代理成本正相关;第二至十大股东持股比例与代理成本呈负相关,对民营上市公司代理成本的影响效果要好于国有控股上市公司;管理者持股比例与代理成本正相关;社会公众股比例与上市公司代理成本不存在相关性;债务总体水平与代理成本正相关,但在国有控股上市公司中的程度要犬于民营上市公司;银行借款比例对代理成本的影响要好于商业信用比例,这两种债务比例对民营上市公司代理成本的效果影响要好于国有控股上市公司;流动负债比例和长期借款比例与上市公司的代理成本正相关。总之。民营上市公司的代理成本要低于国有控股上市公司,资本结构是造成这种差异的重要因素。这一结论的政策意义在于:完善资本结构有助于我国上市公司改善治理结构、降低代理成本;我国政府要进一步推进民营化改革,以不断提高我国上市公司质量。
資本結構如何影響代理成本是資本結構研究的一箇重要領域。本文以2000-2005年國有控股上市公司和民營上市公司為研究對象,通過對這一問題的實證分析髮現,控股股東持股比例與民營上市公司代理成本負相關,而與國有控股上市公司代理成本正相關;第二至十大股東持股比例與代理成本呈負相關,對民營上市公司代理成本的影響效果要好于國有控股上市公司;管理者持股比例與代理成本正相關;社會公衆股比例與上市公司代理成本不存在相關性;債務總體水平與代理成本正相關,但在國有控股上市公司中的程度要犬于民營上市公司;銀行藉款比例對代理成本的影響要好于商業信用比例,這兩種債務比例對民營上市公司代理成本的效果影響要好于國有控股上市公司;流動負債比例和長期藉款比例與上市公司的代理成本正相關。總之。民營上市公司的代理成本要低于國有控股上市公司,資本結構是造成這種差異的重要因素。這一結論的政策意義在于:完善資本結構有助于我國上市公司改善治理結構、降低代理成本;我國政府要進一步推進民營化改革,以不斷提高我國上市公司質量。
자본결구여하영향대리성본시자본결구연구적일개중요영역。본문이2000-2005년국유공고상시공사화민영상시공사위연구대상,통과대저일문제적실증분석발현,공고고동지고비례여민영상시공사대리성본부상관,이여국유공고상시공사대리성본정상관;제이지십대고동지고비례여대리성본정부상관,대민영상시공사대리성본적영향효과요호우국유공고상시공사;관리자지고비례여대리성본정상관;사회공음고비례여상시공사대리성본불존재상관성;채무총체수평여대리성본정상관,단재국유공고상시공사중적정도요견우민영상시공사;은행차관비례대대리성본적영향요호우상업신용비례,저량충채무비례대민영상시공사대리성본적효과영향요호우국유공고상시공사;류동부채비례화장기차관비례여상시공사적대리성본정상관。총지。민영상시공사적대리성본요저우국유공고상시공사,자본결구시조성저충차이적중요인소。저일결론적정책의의재우:완선자본결구유조우아국상시공사개선치리결구、강저대리성본;아국정부요진일보추진민영화개혁,이불단제고아국상시공사질량。
How capital structure influence corporate agency costs is an important area in the research on capital structure. This paper takes the state-controlling listed companies and private listed companies over the time framework between 2000 and 2005 as research objects and make analysis on this question. Through empirical research, we find that the proportion of stocks held by controlling shareholder is negatively correlated with agency costs in private listed companies, and positively correlated with agency costs in state-controlling listed companies; the proportions of stocks held by the second to the tenth largest shareholders are negatively correlated with agency costs, and their influences on agency costs in statecontrolling listed companies are better than that in private listed companies; the executive stock proportion is negatively correlated with agency costs; there is no correlation between of proportion of public held stocks and agency costs; the overall debt level is positively correlated with agency costs, but in state-controlling listed companies the extents are greater than in private listed companies; the influence of bank loans on agency costs is better than that of commercial credits, both of which in private listed companies are better than those in state-controlling listed companies; term of debt is positively correlated with agency costs. All in all, the agency costs is lower in private listed companies than in state-controlling listed companies, capital structure is also one of the most important factors that causes the difference in agency costs between private listed companies and state-controlling listed companies. The significance in policy of this conclusion lies in that perfect capital structure is conducive to improve the governance structure of our listed companies and decrease agency costs, and that our government should further promote the reform for privatization so as to improve the quality of listed companies in our country.