CAJ | 학술논문

内源性融资决定中小公司股权高度集中，其发展受内外部因素约束具有自组织特征。董事会不仅具有决策、执行职能，而且还兼有监督职能和股东大会基本职能，并形成了股东会、董事会、监事会三会合一的公司治理结构。在该结构中，经理层对董事会、董事会对股东大会负责其实质就是对自己负责，对董事会和经理人的监督和激励成为了相互监督、约束、惩罚的内部相互委托一代理制衡机制，委托一代理问题成为了监督权、决策权、经营权三权合一的内部相互委托一代理的重要组织管理模式。其大股东侵害小股东利益以及小股东搭便车和代理人机会主义等公司病症不复存在。针对该模式所具有的中国本土特色的自我保障、自我激励、自我监督效率特点，并根据本土中小公司发展过程，本文提出了相应的政策建议：1．完善内部组织制度，防范绝对权威，以保障中小公司运行效率；2．建立董事会会议信息披露及会议议题实名制制度，以防范卸责行为的发生；3，建立内部竞争、淘汰制度，并随着市场机制不断完善，公司不断发展，逐步引入外部人代理，完善三会分立；4，建立董事会成员内部职工代表制度，以保障员工利益，减少劳资纠纷。
내원성융자결정중소공사고권고도집중，기발전수내외부인소약속구유자조직특정。동사회불부구유결책、집행직능，이차환겸유감독직능화고동대회기본직능，병형성료고동회、동사회、감사회삼회합일적공사치리결구。재해결구중，경리층대동사회、동사회대고동대회부책기실질취시대자기부책，대동사회화경리인적감독화격려성위료상호감독、약속、징벌적내부상호위탁일대리제형궤제，위탁일대리문제성위료감독권、결책권、경영권삼권합일적내부상호위탁일대리적중요조직관리모식。기대고동침해소고동이익이급소고동탑편차화대리인궤회주의등공사병증불복존재。침대해모식소구유적중국본토특색적자아보장、자아격려、자아감독효솔특점，병근거본토중소공사발전과정，본문제출료상응적정책건의：1．완선내부조직제도，방범절대권위，이보장중소공사운행효솔；2．건립동사회회의신식피로급회의의제실명제제도，이방범사책행위적발생；3，건립내부경쟁、도태제도，병수착시장궤제불단완선，공사불단발전，축보인입외부인대리，완선삼회분립；4，건립동사회성원내부직공대표제도，이보장원공이익，감소로자규분。
Based on the questionnaires of 672 small-medium sized companies, this research finds that the co-organizers＇ financing will lead to the highly centralized shareholder＇s equity in the family type small-medium sized companies. The board of the director＇s members not only plays the role of decision-making, executive function, but also serves the supervision and the fundamental functions of the board of the share-holders. Actually, in such companies, the board of the director members, the board of the share-holders and the board of the supervision members incorporates into one. Under such governance structure, the responsibility system of the manager-for-the board of the director members and the board of di- rector members-for-the board of the shareholders actually becomes a self-responsibility system. The supervision and incentive also becomes mutual supervision, mutual control and mutual punishment. Entrust-agent will be the combination of supervision rights; decision-making rights and operation rights, which is internal mutual entrust-agent management model. In this model, the phenomena such as the big shareholders invade the legal rights of the small shareholders; the small shareholders take rides or the agents opportunism will no longer exist in the companies. This kind of internal mutual entrust-agent balancing mechanism demonstrates the Chinese characteristics of self-protecting; self-encouraging and self-supervising. According to the development process the authors conclude the research with some suggestions to improve this model： 1. better the internal organization system so as to promote the executive efficiency and to avoid the occurrence of absolute authority; 2. establish the system of exposing the meetings of the board of the director members and the true-name system for the topics to be discussed so that no responsibility-evasion may happen; 3. establish the internal-competition system and the washing-out system to help the introduction of outside agents and the improvement of three-boarddivision; 4. establish the workers＇ representative conference system under the guidance of the board of the director members so as to guarantee the workers benefits and decrease the conflicts between the capitalists and the workers.