CAJ | 학술논문

针对供应链R＆D投资套牢问题，以博弈论为工具，在一个两层供应链系统中，研究下游制造商从事成本节约型R＆D时上游供应商的批发价格策略。主要考虑了供应商在保持批发价格灵活性和承诺批发价格下制造商的创新投资以及产量决策。研究表明，无论溢出水平多大，供应商承诺批发价格都会导致制造商R＆D投资和产品产量的增加，但无论在哪种价格策略下，制造商的R＆D投资和产品产量都是溢出水平的减函数。
침대공응련R＆D투자투뢰문제，이박혁론위공구，재일개량층공응련계통중，연구하유제조상종사성본절약형R＆D시상유공응상적비발개격책략。주요고필료공응상재보지비발개격령활성화승낙비발개격하제조상적창신투자이급산량결책。연구표명，무론일출수평다대，공응상승낙비발개격도회도치제조상R＆D투자화산품산량적증가，단무론재나충개격책략하，제조상적R＆D투자화산품산량도시일출수평적감함수。
In order to solve the hold-up problem in supply chain, this paper uses game theory to study the upstream supplier＇s wholesale pricing strategies in a two-tier supply chain when the downstream manufacture is engaging in the cost reducing R＆D. We mainly research on the decision about innovation and quantity when suppliers retain price flexibility or make an advance commitment to price. It is shown that a supplier＇s commitment to price can lead to more R＆D investment and expected quantity whatever the spillovers is. R＆D investment and expected quantity are decreasing in the spillover level for all pricing strategies of a supplier.