CAJ | 학술논문

如何设计后股权分置时代的高管报酬机制将面临很多挑战。研究表明,短期报酬具有有效性,这意味着在设计国有控股公司的股权激励时,依然不能忽略短期报酬激励和职务升迁等政治和非货币的激励;长期报酬激励不显著,这说明我国股权激励的“利益趋同效应”不明显,目前股权激励的有效性前提还不够;高管激励倾斜度低说明“大锅饭”仍未打破,这需要解除报酬管制,向核心高管倾斜,避免“搭便车”式的激励;长短期报酬结构的结果说明如果将固定任期制转为弹性任期制,更能实现报酬激励的有效性。
여하설계후고권분치시대적고관보수궤제장면림흔다도전。연구표명,단기보수구유유효성,저의미착재설계국유공고공사적고권격려시,의연불능홀략단기보수격려화직무승천등정치화비화폐적격려;장기보수격려불현저,저설명아국고권격려적“이익추동효응”불명현,목전고권격려적유효성전제환불구;고관격려경사도저설명“대과반”잉미타파,저수요해제보수관제,향핵심고관경사,피면“탑편차”식적격려;장단기보수결구적결과설명여과장고정임기제전위탄성임기제,경능실현보수격려적유효성。
This is an empirical study on the effectiveness of compensation Incentive Systems for Chinese Top Managers by researching into Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange listed companies from 2002 to 2004. The empirical results suggest that short-term incentive is effective, and it means when designing the remuneration incentive of stateowned enterprises, we cannot neglect political and non-monetary incentive, such as short-term incentive and position promotion. Longterm incentive is ineffective, which means ＂ behalf alignment effect＂ of share option incentive not obvious and the premises of effectiveness not sufficiently. The low gradient of incentive of top managers indicated the equalitarianism of compensation is not broken. It needs to relieve the control of compensation incentive, inclining to the core manager and avoiding free ride incentive. The compensation structure of short-term and long-term reflects that it needs convert the fixed tenure system into flexible tenure system to implement the effectiveness of remuneration incentive.