浙江大学学报:人文社会科学版
浙江大學學報:人文社會科學版
절강대학학보:인문사회과학판
Journal of Zhejiang University(Humanities and Social Sciences)
2008年
2期
136~142
,共null页
集群 内部治理结构 升级
集群 內部治理結構 升級
집군 내부치리결구 승급
cluster; internal governance structure; upgrade
根据浙江省地方产业集群的调研,集群的内部治理结构可以分为准层级、短距离市场、短距离市场+准层级三种类型。一般而言,具有短距离市场治理结构的集群,工艺和产品升级比较缓慢,其主要原因是集群内的中小企业缺少合作与联系;如果能有一个强有力的行业协会引导企业间的协作,则集群具有较大的升级潜力。准层级治理结构的集群中,如果大企业具有绝对领导权,则集群工艺和产品升级容易实现,但中小企业易被锁定在生产环节;如果大企业的权威性不显著,则中小企业间容易产生恶性竞争,影响升级。短距离市场+准层级治理结构是上述两种情况的综合,具有这种治理结构的集群一般都有大型的专业市场,如果专业市场竞争有序,则集群具备实现整体升级的优势;反之,专业市场可能会演变为"柠檬市场",使整个集群的发展陷入信誉危机。
根據浙江省地方產業集群的調研,集群的內部治理結構可以分為準層級、短距離市場、短距離市場+準層級三種類型。一般而言,具有短距離市場治理結構的集群,工藝和產品升級比較緩慢,其主要原因是集群內的中小企業缺少閤作與聯繫;如果能有一箇彊有力的行業協會引導企業間的協作,則集群具有較大的升級潛力。準層級治理結構的集群中,如果大企業具有絕對領導權,則集群工藝和產品升級容易實現,但中小企業易被鎖定在生產環節;如果大企業的權威性不顯著,則中小企業間容易產生噁性競爭,影響升級。短距離市場+準層級治理結構是上述兩種情況的綜閤,具有這種治理結構的集群一般都有大型的專業市場,如果專業市場競爭有序,則集群具備實現整體升級的優勢;反之,專業市場可能會縯變為"檸檬市場",使整箇集群的髮展陷入信譽危機。
근거절강성지방산업집군적조연,집군적내부치리결구가이분위준층급、단거리시장、단거리시장+준층급삼충류형。일반이언,구유단거리시장치리결구적집군,공예화산품승급비교완만,기주요원인시집군내적중소기업결소합작여련계;여과능유일개강유력적행업협회인도기업간적협작,칙집군구유교대적승급잠력。준층급치리결구적집군중,여과대기업구유절대령도권,칙집군공예화산품승급용역실현,단중소기업역피쇄정재생산배절;여과대기업적권위성불현저,칙중소기업간용역산생악성경쟁,영향승급。단거리시장+준층급치리결구시상술량충정황적종합,구유저충치리결구적집군일반도유대형적전업시장,여과전업시장경쟁유서,칙집군구비실현정체승급적우세;반지,전업시장가능회연변위"저몽시장",사정개집군적발전함입신예위궤。
According to the survey on the industry clusters of Zhejiang Province, a cluster's internal governance structure can be categorized into three types: Quasi-hierarchy, Arm's length market as well as Quasi-hierarchy and Arm's length market. Generally speaking, market-based clusters suffer from slow process of product upgrading for the isolated relationship and lack of cooperation among small medium sized enterprises (SMEs). They would show the great upgrading potential providing that SMEs are guided to collaborate efficiently by a strong trade association. Clusters with the Quasi-hierarchy governance structure are likely to lead to fast upgrading in technology and products if the large enterprises hold the absolute leading position, but the SMEs would be locked in production link. In the absence of powerful large enterprises, blind competition may appear among SMEs and hinder upgrading. Quasi-hierarchy and Arm's length market governance structure which usually equips with a large-scale specialized market is a synthesis of the two above-mentioned inner governance structures. Only enterprises in the specialized market compete orderly, could interactive development be realized between the large enterprises and SMEs, which will gradually lead to the overall upgrading of the cluster. Otherwise the specialized market might deteriorate into "lemon market", which will drive the development of the cluster into a credibility crisis. Therefore, upgrading of such clusters postulates the upgrading of the corresponding specialized markets.