CAJ | 학술논문

控制权配置与激励安排是组织治理中的两个重要工具，本文首先从组织中委托入私人收益角度分析委托入控制权与代理人激励之间可能的冲突，进而通过上市公司数据对这一冲突关系进行经验检验。我们的研究发现，中国上市公司大股东控制权与管理层股权激励之间存在显著的冲突，而且这种冲突与股权性质、公司成长速度相关。民营控股公司中的冲突程度显著弱于其他类型公司，国资委控股公司中的冲突显著强于其他类型公司；而公司成长速度越快，大股东控制权与管理层激励之间的冲突越强。本文的研究结果能够很好地解释中国上市国有企业中股权激励效果不显著、甚至出现负效应的经验现象，并由此提出相应的政策建议。
공제권배치여격려안배시조직치리중적량개중요공구，본문수선종조직중위탁입사인수익각도분석위탁입공제권여대리인격려지간가능적충돌，진이통과상시공사수거대저일충돌관계진행경험검험。아문적연구발현，중국상시공사대고동공제권여관리층고권격려지간존재현저적충돌，이차저충충돌여고권성질、공사성장속도상관。민영공고공사중적충돌정도현저약우기타류형공사，국자위공고공사중적충돌현저강우기타류형공사；이공사성장속도월쾌，대고동공제권여관리층격려지간적충돌월강。본문적연구결과능구흔호지해석중국상시국유기업중고권격려효과불현저、심지출현부효응적경험현상，병유차제출상응적정책건의。
The allocation of control rights and the provision of incentives are two fundamentals in corporate governance. This paper analyzes the conflicts between control rights and incentives resulted from private interests of principals, and tests the hypothesis with data from Chinese listed companies. We find that the coefficient of the interaction between the control rights of large shareholders and the manager＇s incentives is significantly negative, and the degree of such conflicts depends on the property ownership and the growth rate of companies. The degree of conflicts is significantly lower in private owned companies, while significantly higher in companies owned by the Committee of State Asset Management, and will increase with the growth of companies. These results can explain the zero （or negative） effects of stock incentives on corporate performance in Chinese SOEs, and argue the previous findings which take ownership structure as necessary for the effectiveness of stock incentives.