CAJ | 학술논문

矿区作为生态经济系统的一个有机载体,存在不同的经济组织和利益群体。这些利益群体之间的利益整体水平和获取利益的能力有较大的差异,由此引发了不同利益群体之间的利益冲突。本文以经济博奕论理论为基础,运用F-H分析法构造了非量化的矿区博弈分析模型,详细分析了矿区生态经济系统中利益冲突的可能结局,并得出了维护矿区生态经济利益的关键在于矿区所在地的政府和环保执法部门执法力度的结论。
광구작위생태경제계통적일개유궤재체,존재불동적경제조직화이익군체。저사이익군체지간적이익정체수평화획취이익적능력유교대적차이,유차인발료불동이익군체지간적이익충돌。본문이경제박혁론이론위기출,운용F-H분석법구조료비양화적광구박혁분석모형,상세분석료광구생태경제계통중이익충돌적가능결국,병득출료유호광구생태경제이익적관건재우광구소재지적정부화배보집법부문집법력도적결론。
As the carrier of ecological economy system, there are several different economy organizations and interest groups. For the difference in the whole level of interest and the ability of gaining interest between different interest groups, the interest conflict between these groups is taken place. This paper bases on the game theory of economy, constructs a non-quantity game theory analytic model by the way of Fraser-Hipel. And analyses the possible come-offs of interest conflict in the ecological economy system of diggings area in detail. In the end, the paper sums up that the key to maintain the eco-economy interest in diggings area depends on the force of law executing.