CAJ | 학술논문

研究了2种不同信息条件下制造商的订购问题，建立了在2种情况下制造商的订购量决策模型。以原材料的质量水平为供应商的决策变量，假设制造商的质量检验水平一定，转移支付和订购量为制造商的决策变量。当供应商隐匿原材料的质量水平时，制造商需要比信息公开时订购更多的量，并且在此情况下，整个供应链的收益要低于信息公开时的供应链收益。
연구료2충불동신식조건하제조상적정구문제，건립료재2충정황하제조상적정구량결책모형。이원재료적질량수평위공응상적결책변량，가설제조상적질량검험수평일정，전이지부화정구량위제조상적결책변량。당공응상은닉원재료적질량수평시，제조상수요비신식공개시정구경다적량，병차재차정황하，정개공응련적수익요저우신식공개시적공응련수익。
Purchase strategies for manufacturer are studied according to symmetrical information and asymmetric information, for which this paper sets up two kinds of supply chain quantity decision models including a buyer and a supplier. For the two models, the supplier takes quality of materials as a variable, and the manufacturer takes order quantity and transfer payment as two variables with the same quality evaluation. When the supplier secretes the quality of materials, the manufacturer has to purchase more materials, which leads to the decline of the benefit of the whole supply chain.