CAJ | 학술논문

认为控股股东的股权流动性是重要的公司治理机制，提供一个控股股东股权流动性与隧道挖掘行为的一个简单模型。模型显示对于以资产价值最大化为目标的大股东，他们所持股权的流动性将影响其隧道行为的机会成本，基于总体资产价值最大化的约束，控股股东可能采取支持上市公司而不是掏空上市公司的做法，即“负隧道效应（Negative Tunneling）”。在定向增发过程中，出于总体资产价值最大化的考虑，控股股东可能选择注入优质资产而不是劣质资产。初步的实证检验支持这个结论。
인위공고고동적고권류동성시중요적공사치리궤제，제공일개공고고동고권류동성여수도알굴행위적일개간단모형。모형현시대우이자산개치최대화위목표적대고동，타문소지고권적류동성장영향기수도행위적궤회성본，기우총체자산개치최대화적약속，공고고동가능채취지지상시공사이불시도공상시공사적주법，즉“부수도효응（Negative Tunneling）”。재정향증발과정중，출우총체자산개치최대화적고필，공고고동가능선택주입우질자산이불시렬질자산。초보적실증검험지지저개결론。
This paper holds that liquidity of controlling shareholder＇s stake is an important variable to deal with cor- porate governmen system. This paper establishes a simple model to explore relationship between liquidity and tunneling behavior. It shows that for those shareholders who wish to maximize their asset value, the liquidity will affect their opportunity cost, so in order to maximize their asset value, they maybe prop up the listed company rather than tunnel the company, i. e., negative tunneling. In the case of private security offering, the liquidity of controlling shareholder＇s stake may affect the choice of asset quality sold to the listed company, subject to constraint of maximization of its total asset, the controlling shareholder may choose to sell superior asset rather than inferior asset to the listed comoanv. Preliminary emnirical test sunnorts that argument.