商业研究
商業研究
상업연구
Commercial Research
2008年
7期
9~12
,共null页
信息不对称 演化博弈 复制动态机制 演化稳定策略
信息不對稱 縯化博弈 複製動態機製 縯化穩定策略
신식불대칭 연화박혁 복제동태궤제 연화은정책략
asymmetric information; evolutionary game; replicator dynamics mechanism; evolutionary stable strategy
传统博弈理论关于参与人完全理性的假设,难以应用于现实工作中。而基于有限理性的演化博弈理论则克服了这些缺陷。从激励的角度建立信息不对称环境下供应商与零售商的非对称演化博弈模型,采用复制动态机制对博弈模型进行详细分析,得出模型的三个局部平衡点不是演化稳定策略;而另外两个平衡点哪个是模型最终的演化稳定策略是由五个假设因素决定。
傳統博弈理論關于參與人完全理性的假設,難以應用于現實工作中。而基于有限理性的縯化博弈理論則剋服瞭這些缺陷。從激勵的角度建立信息不對稱環境下供應商與零售商的非對稱縯化博弈模型,採用複製動態機製對博弈模型進行詳細分析,得齣模型的三箇跼部平衡點不是縯化穩定策略;而另外兩箇平衡點哪箇是模型最終的縯化穩定策略是由五箇假設因素決定。
전통박혁이론관우삼여인완전이성적가설,난이응용우현실공작중。이기우유한이성적연화박혁이론칙극복료저사결함。종격려적각도건립신식불대칭배경하공응상여령수상적비대칭연화박혁모형,채용복제동태궤제대박혁모형진행상세분석,득출모형적삼개국부평형점불시연화은정책략;이령외량개평형점나개시모형최종적연화은정책략시유오개가설인소결정。
The restrictions of complete rationality, makes the traditional game theory hardly applicable in practice the traditional game theory. However, the evolutionary game theory, based on bounded rationality, can overcome those limitations. From the perspective of compensation the paper sets up an asymmetric model of the evolutionary game between supplier and retailer with asymmetric information. By analyzing the game model with replicated dynamics mechanism, it maintains that the three local balance points of the model are not the evolutionary stable strategy; yet setween the other two balance points which is the final evolutionary stable strategy depends on the five hypothetic factors.