CAJ | 학술논문

本文引入了成本收益分析和博弈分析工具，对银行监管协调与合作的成本和收益进行比较，对银行监管不同主体的协调与合作意愿进行分析。通过分析，寻求监管主体协调与合作的均衡点和中国银行监管当局政策的着力点。笔者认为，各监管主体为了争取监管协调主动权，扩大影响力，都存在加大协调力度的倾向。在银监会与国外监管当局的博弈分析中，笔者引入合作溢价概念，并就两国监管当局在完全信息下的博弈情况进行分析，得出若干不同的结论。最后，笔者根据分析结论，提出优化监管协调与合作的相关政策建议。
본문인입료성본수익분석화박혁분석공구，대은행감관협조여합작적성본화수익진행비교，대은행감관불동주체적협조여합작의원진행분석。통과분석，심구감관주체협조여합작적균형점화중국은행감관당국정책적착력점。필자인위，각감관주체위료쟁취감관협조주동권，확대영향력，도존재가대협조력도적경향。재은감회여국외감관당국적박혁분석중，필자인입합작일개개념，병취량국감관당국재완전신식하적박혁정황진행분석，득출약간불동적결론。최후，필자근거분석결론，제출우화감관협조여합작적상관정책건의。
In this paper, the author introduces cost-revenue and game analysis, compares the cost to the revenue of the coordination and cooperation in banking regulation, and then analyzes the willingness of different subjects in banking regulation. Through analysis, the author wants to seek for the balance point of different subjects in coordination and cooperation, and for the focus of regulation authority＇ s policies in China. The author believes that each subject inclines to intensify efforts for coordination to gain initiative and expand influence in supervision and regulation. In the analysis of the game between China＇ s Banking Regulatory Commission and foreigu regulatory authorities, the author employs the concept of cooperation premium and reaches several conclusions about their game situation under complete information circumstances. Finally, some policy suggestions to improve coordination and cooperation in banking supervision and regulation are proposed.