CAJ | 학술논문

本文在对我国煤矿生产安全各相关者在生产安全监管中的收益、损失进行分析的基础上，构建各利益相关者的收益函数，并运用博弈论的方法分析各相关者在生产安全监管中的合作与博弈行为。中央政府、地方政府、煤矿和矿工监管收益的差异导致了他们在监管行为上博弈，监管博弈过程实质上就是监管利益再分配过程，如何调整监管利益再分配是提高监管效率的关键。本文最后对我国煤矿生产安全及监管提出了对策建议。
본문재대아국매광생산안전각상관자재생산안전감관중적수익、손실진행분석적기출상，구건각이익상관자적수익함수，병운용박혁론적방법분석각상관자재생산안전감관중적합작여박혁행위。중앙정부、지방정부、매광화광공감관수익적차이도치료타문재감관행위상박혁，감관박혁과정실질상취시감관이익재분배과정，여하조정감관이익재분배시제고감관효솔적관건。본문최후대아국매광생산안전급감관제출료대책건의。
At first, this paper studied on all parties＇ gains and losses from the supervision to colliery safety production in our country, then, constructed their receipt functions respectively, and analyzed the parties＇ actions in the supervision by the game theory. The differences of the receipts of central government, local governments, collieries and colliers from regulatory led to their behavior game, and the game process is a process of the re-regulation interest distribution. So, how to distribute the regulatory interest was the key to improve the regulatory efficiency. Based on the analysis as above, this paper suggested to safety production and the supervision in colliery in our country.