CAJ | 학술논문

本文通过一个基于代表性企业与银行之间的博弈模型，讨论了信用资本的性质、价值度量及其对企业借贷行为的影响。文章认为，信用资本的性质与价值量将会影响到企业的财务与融资决策行为。信用信息共享为降低银行信贷风险、扩大信贷规模提供了一个基础设施，而有效的失信惩戒机制在其中起着关键作用。因此，我国应尽快建立包含有效的守信激励和失信惩戒机制的信用信息共享体系，这也可看作是对我国信用体系建设热潮的一个理论解释。
본문통과일개기우대표성기업여은행지간적박혁모형，토론료신용자본적성질、개치도량급기대기업차대행위적영향。문장인위，신용자본적성질여개치량장회영향도기업적재무여융자결책행위。신용신식공향위강저은행신대풍험、확대신대규모제공료일개기출설시，이유효적실신징계궤제재기중기착관건작용。인차，아국응진쾌건립포함유효적수신격려화실신징계궤제적신용신식공향체계，저야가간작시대아국신용체계건설열조적일개이론해석。
Based on a game model between a representative firm and a bank, the paper investigates the nature and measurement of the capital of creditworthy, as well as its impact on the firm＇s borrowing behavior. The authors believe that, as a kind of social capital, creditworthy has its own intrinsic value, especially in the context of credit information sharing. As the value of-creditworthy will influence the firm＇s borrowing behavior, credit information sharing provides a kind of infrastructure for the loan market, in which the interest rate penalizing mechanism plays a vital role. Such a framework is also a theoretic explanation for China＇s current credit system construction.